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law and economic change during the short
twentieth century
john henry schlegel

At the beginning of the short twentieth century heavy, blue-collar industry
dominated the physical economy. Railroads were the dominant form of
continental transportation; the ocean liner (for passengers) and the freighter
(for cargo) the only available form of intercontinental transportation. Radio
was the new, wonderful, transformative industry, and national consumer
brands were beginning their domination of the grocery store’s growing
cornucopia.
At the end of the century, service industries dominate the economy.
Were there any notion of the physical economy, it would probably focus on
multiple kinds of imported consumer goods. Continental transportation of
goods is dominated by interstate trucking; that of passengers, by airplanes.
The ocean liner has changed into a ﬂoating hotel called the cruise ship;
intercontinental passengers travel by air and goods in large steel boxes on
truly ungainly looking, specially designed container ships. The Internet
qualiﬁes as the new, wonderful, transformative industry, and produce from
Latin America has begun to dominate the grocery store’s still expanding
bounty.
Looked at in a more schematic way, the story is the same. During years
that witnessed an amazing growth in the administrative apparatus of all levels of government, there simultaneously occurred three large-scale changes,
three of those developments that somehow deﬁne eras. First, the middle class
expanded to include a portion of the working class as part of a dominating
consumer culture. Second, the imperial Northeastern manufacturing economy, the colonial Southern agricultural economy, and the colonial Western
agricultural and natural resources economy all declined while simultaneously a lighter manufacturing economy in the South and West grew, as
did a service economy throughout the country. And third, the American
island economy that followed World War II declined as a signiﬁcantly more
international economy of manufacturing, ﬁnance, and, to a lesser extent,
agriculture and natural resources took shape.
563

564

John Henry Schlegel

Surely then, these years have seen profound economic change. Yet in some
ways, a concomitant change in the way that the economy is experienced,
structured, thought of is equally important. At the beginning of the short
twentieth century the model of a good economy was one in which groups
of manufacturers or retailers believed that, by associating together with the
objective of treating each other fairly, a high-price, high- wage economy
could deliver prosperity for all. And during the Depression the federal
government put into place a legal framework that could support such an
associationalist economy. But by the end of that century, such a model was
of interest only to historians. Its obliteration was so complete that many
advocates of unionized labor had little understanding of how their language
of fairness tied into a lost economic model dependent on local and regional
oligopolistic conduct. In place of that model we now have a new one, based
on atomized and decentralized production tied together with round-theclock instantaneous communication and with ﬁnancial structures favoring
very short time horizons, that has for its hallmark a collective obsession
with speedy ﬂexibility.
What signiﬁcance can we ascribe to law – by which I mean the many
and variable actions undertaken by lawyers and other governmental ofﬁcials, the
formal and effective norms originating from the practices of these individuals, and
the systematic presuppositions shared among them – in the extraordinary story of
economic change that is the short twentieth century? I wish to argue that,
properly understood, the answer to this question is “very little,” though a
not unimportant “very little.” In so arguing, I am not to be understood as
embracing either of the following perspectives on the general relationship
of law and economy. First, law is not simply a prisoner of the market forces
of a time and place. Nor, second, is it irrelevant except to the extent that
it unwisely attempts to constrain market actors from pursuing their selfinterest. Rather, the pervasiveness of law in structuring the economy of this
and any other set of years is or ought to be obvious to all but the most
unreﬂective Marxist or vulgar free marketeer. Indeed, I would go so far as to
assert that, at any given time and place, price – the efﬁcient market solution
to a question of demand and supply – is fully determined by law, seen as
a set of legal entitlements, together with the set of resource endowments
distributed among economic actors at that time and place. Moreover, any
signiﬁcant alteration in those legal entitlements will cause an alteration in
that efﬁcient market solution. However, questions about such, almost static
equilibriums are not my concern here. Instead, I wish to talk about change,
about movement from one economy to another.
Then what do I mean by “an economy?” An economy, a persistent market structure, is the fusion of an understanding of economic life with the patterns
of behavior within the economic, political, and social institutions that enact that
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understanding. Law contributes pervasively to any such understanding; it
afﬁrms, structures or restructures, and so, in an obviously separable sense,
enacts, the relevant institutions that economic actors use when buying and
selling, working and investing, as part of their daily life. But questions of
economic change are not answered by summing all of the activities, including legal change, that make up daily economic life. Economic change is the
shift from one enacted (in both senses) understanding of economic life to
another – in the case of the short twentieth century, from an associationalist
economy to what I call an impatient economy. In this chapter I hope ﬁrst
to explicate this economic change, and then to interrogate it in order to
understand the role of law in its occurrence.1
I. THE TWENTIES AND THIRTIES: AN ASSOCIATIONALIST
IDEAL

At the end of World War I, the United States, which had just completed an
extraordinary period of industrial expansion followed by one of industrial
concentration, was the largest national economy in the world. Its greatest
strength, aside from a substantial natural resource base, was its enormous
domestic market tied together by a strong railroad network that allowed
the country to be a relatively insolated, self-sufﬁcient economic entity. This
is not to say that the United States did not participate in international trade
and ﬁnance. It was a key player in both areas. Rather, the size of the domestic
market and its relative afﬂuence meant that most manufacturers and many
retailers had a market so large that they could grow to an enormous size
based on transactions within the domestic economy alone, protected, of
course, from foreign competition by relatively high trade barriers.
Given these obvious advantages, the economy’s overall performance in
the following two decades was surprisingly erratic, but overall disastrously
weak. A sharp postwar inﬂationary spurt was followed ﬁrst by an equally
1

A word about periodization is in order. I take the twenties to extend from the end of
the postwar demobilization – about 1919 – until the stock market crash in 1929. The
thirties is a long period continuing until 1941 when, with the adoption of Lend-Lease,
the U.S. economy was placed on a wartime footing. The forties extend only to 1947, the
end of the post-war inﬂation. Then came the ﬁfties. The sixties begin late – in 1962 –
and end with the rise in oil prices that accompanied the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The
seventies continue until the onset of the Reagan administration in 1981 or maybe until
inﬂation ﬁnally turns down in the wake of the terrible recession of 1982. The eighties
begin thereafter or possibly in 1979 when the Federal Reserve Board moved to contract
the money supply sharply, and last until the end of the recession just before the start of
the Clinton administration, that is the nineties. These are, I must emphasize, economic
periods; I would identify social periods quite differently.
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sharp recession and then by a somewhat frenetic period of genuine growth.
Thereafter, a general recession that began just slightly before the famous
stock market crash of October 1929 terminated a classic market bubble
turned serious – turned into the Depression. Four years later, when the
economy bottomed out, the unemployment rate was about 25 percent;
prices, particularly of farm products, had declined signiﬁcantly; mortgage
foreclosures had hit record levels, as had bank failures; and not surprisingly,
industrial production had plummeted as well. For the balance of the decade
the economy grew slowly, interrupted only by a decline in 1937, though
not to the level of its pre-Depression high.
If one factors out the substantial amount of noise in the economic record
of these years, several signiﬁcant changes stand out. The most obvious is
the growth of an extensive consumer electric (though surely not electronic)
appliance industry led by radios, irons, vacuum cleaners, and to a much
lesser extent refrigerators, as electrical service was extended to most urban
and increasing numbers of rural households. Equally noticeable was the
great expansion in automobile ownership, though here the impact of this
growth was more signiﬁcant in rural areas, where auto ownership provided
a signiﬁcant opportunity to reduce isolation, than in urban ones, where
existing transit networks and shops within walking distance made the cost
of ownership seem more of a barrier to purchase.
More invisible, but in the long run equally signiﬁcant, were two changes.
The ﬁrst was the slow development of the commercial aircraft industry
whose major success with the DC-3 began the increase in air travel in the
late thirties. The second was the expansion of consumer services, especially
in the twenties, both in the ﬁnancial area, with the growth of installment
purchase of autos and appliances, and in retail trades of all kinds. Nevertheless, the economy of the Northeast still was dominated by heavy industrial
production, such as steel, autos, and electrical machinery, and by rail transport, all of which employed enormous numbers of blue-collar, variously
skilled workers, pretty much in accordance with late-nineteenth-century
industrial norms. The South was still largely an agricultural economy and
the West an agricultural and mining economy. Both thus provided lowvalue goods to feed Northeastern factories and mouths. The whole was
stitched together with a railroad system that had reached its peak size just
before the Great War and had begun to shrink in size thereafter.
With immigration cut off, the ethnic makeup of the population was
largely settled; immigrants and their families from Eastern and Southern Europe provided much of the workforce in the large industrial plants.
This was the backbone of the working class. Northern Europeans provided
much of the white-collar workforce, staff and line, that ran the predominantly dispersed, divisional structure of large industrial corporations. These
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individuals were the dominant element in the middle and lower middle class
that had come numerically to overwhelm the upper middle class of professionals and local owners of shops and small factories. At the same time,
the growth of line functions in large industrial corporations and of service
industries brought an increase in female, particularly unmarried female,
waged labor, beyond the traditional work in textiles and apparel.
Such a structure to the economy was not wholly surprising, given the
persistence of the remains of the large turn-of-the-century industry-speciﬁc
mergers designed to create effective product monopolies. The surviving
ﬁrms had, as a result of effective antitrust intervention during the Taft and
Wilson administrations, devolved into relatively stable oligopolies that
tended both to maintain their production processes and to grow vertically
so as to control supplies and distribution. At the same time, “discounters”
or “chain stores” – national retail organizations such as the Great Atlantic
& Paciﬁc Tea Company (the A & P), Sears, Roebuck & Co., or Montgomery,
Ward & Company – began to establish branches in order to inﬁltrate local
retailing markets that previously were effectively insulated from competition by the still signiﬁcant difﬁculties of greater than local passenger
transportation. The simultaneous growth of distribution through nationally controlled, locally franchised retailing organizations caused much consternation to local elites unused to more than incidental competition at the
retail level. As a result, these local elites began to utter the same variety of
complaints about ruinous or destructive competition and predatory pricing
that had been voiced by those large manufacturers who sought refuge in the
great merger movement twenty-ﬁve years earlier. These complaints, which
continued to be heard from producers in such more competitive industrial
segments such as lumber, coal, and cement, coalesced in a movement that
is commonly called associationalism.
Many economic theorists who supported associationalism in the twenties
and thirties believed that economic instability was the result of excess
production of goods and services coupled with relentless downward pressure
on producer prices caused by “chiselers” who reduced prices and otherwise
“cut corners” for temporary personal advantage. These economists argued
that downward pressure on prices could be resisted if producers banded
together into groups that would work both to “coordinate” production
(i.e., manage reduction and expansion) and to isolate and vilify chiselers,
so as to enforce good – and thereby suppress “unfair” – trade practices.
This theory also held that insufﬁcient demand in poor times could be
remedied by increasing employment and by providing Social Security and
unemployment insurance so that the disposable income of wage earners,
and thus demand, could be maintained: a Keynesian prescription before
John Maynard Keynes produced his famous volume.
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Associationalism was essentially a Main Street, though not therefore a
small town, theory. It hoped to maintain high wages through the high prices
that would support the small, local retail or wholesale businesses that were
being undercut by the growth of large regional or national retailers, as well
as the more competitive sectors of the producer economy. This design was for
an economy of uniform, high prices, such as that found in more oligopolistic
markets or as was enshrined in the steel industry’s basing-point price system
whereby all steel prices were quoted as if the product were being shipped
from Pittsburgh. It denied distant local producers locational monopoly
pricing ability, but at the same time allowed them to make up in freight
charges collected, but not incurred, the costs associated with their smaller
scale, and so higher cost, production processes.
Not laissez-faire in a different guise, associationalism assumed some level
of governmental involvement in the economy, as beﬁts a theory whose public champion was Herbert Hoover, ﬁrst as Secretary of Commerce under
both Harding and Coolidge and then as president. Supported by the Federal
Trade Commission, the theory received and required a crabbed construction
of the antitrust laws so as to permit associations to perform their regulatory
and disciplinary functions, as well as some legal support for suppressing
unfair trade practices. It also seemed to require high trade protection for
American industries, and indeed, these ideas are popularly associated with
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. When reduced to legislation, associationalism regularly echoed Progressive concerns about the protection of
small producers and ordinary workers, as can be seen in the “ﬁrst” New
Deal of the Roosevelt administration, in which associationalism spawned
the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as well as
such seemingly unrelated legislation as the Social Security Act, the Wagner
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Federal Housing Act, and the
Robinson-Patman Act. The prevalence of agricultural marketing cooperatives and state retail price maintenance statutes are of a piece. Surviving
bits of the self-regulatory norm inherent in the theory still can be found in
the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the numerous bodies setting industry standards that exist in ﬁelds
such as plumbing and electrical equipment. The theory can even be seen in
Karl Llewellyn’s early plans for the sales article of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The accuracy of the associationalist diagnosis of the problems of business
in the twenties and thirties is, for present purposes, unimportant. Accurate
or not, the managed, associationalist market was a prominent economic
ideal in the years between the wars. However, that ideal had another side
to it. Stabilization of prices at high levels and control over the introduction
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of innovation protected the market position of large producers as well as
small retailers. For such producers, the theory could be seen as justifying classic cartel behavior, behavior that in Europe led to collusion with
large trades’ unions and to industry-wide bargaining, still epitomized by
the metalworkers union in Germany. In the United States this variation
on the cartel model supported the relatively static competitive position of
participants in the more oligopolistic markets. Under oligopolistic competition, leading ﬁrms in effect negotiated price publicly and then strove
to avoid undercutting that price. Simultaneously, they used their research
staffs and advertising to generate product differentiation that might alter
market share in their favor, always dreading the possibility that a competitor would develop a “breakthrough” product that could remake current,
reasonably stable relationships in unforeseen ways.
Although associationalism as a theory clearly preferred the private organization of markets implicit in the ideal of an association, it just as clearly
recognized that stable economic relationships that yielded high prices, high
wages, and continuous proﬁts could be established by governmental regulation. Thus, it could support a regulatory response to the widely felt
sense that a weak and speculative ﬁnancial system was a contributor to the
Depression. The extension of speculative credit, especially in the real property and securities markets, was viewed as “unfair,” as were widespread selfdealing, manipulation, and even fraud in bank lending practices and in the
underwriting of securities issues and their trading in the stock market. The
response at the federal level was the creation of signiﬁcant federal legislation
directed at boosting conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system. The Glass-Steagall
Act (Banking Act of 1933), requiring a separation of commercial from
investment banking, and the legislation establishing the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Federal Farm Credit Administration were each designed to increase the soundness of the banking system by
creating the stable, proﬁtable relationships among the providers of a major
source of credit for the economy that were favored by associationalism’s
theorists. The legislation establishing the Securities Exchange Commission
and securing for it the means for regulating the securities markets based on
a principle of disclosure and of penalties for non-disclosure, including the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act, and the Trust Indenture Act, was structured similarly.
Together such legislation was designed to strengthen those institutions
essential for the credit and investment expansion that would undergird
recovery, and, not incidentally, honestly ﬁnance both oligopolistic producers and Main Street merchants.

570

John Henry Schlegel
Law and Economic Change: An Initial Interrogation

This brief recounting of the American economy in the twenties and thirties
raises obvious questions about law and economic change. As one lists even
a small part of the New Deal’s legislation, one can quickly identify the
response of law to economic dislocation. Local relief efforts were supplemented with funds supplied by federal programs mounted by the Works
Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, programs
that are largely lost in any brief telling of the story of the economy in these
years, but crucial for those whose hunger they reduced and shelter they
supported. The great structural statutes in agriculture, banking, communications, labor, securities, and transportation that survived Supreme Court
challenge, as well as those that did not – the National Recovery Act (NRA)
and Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) – also exemplify the way that law
is regularly mobilized in times of trouble. All were signiﬁcant changes in
the doctrinal matrix that is the law at a time and place. They can even be
seen to have signiﬁcantly aided the creation of the administrative state. But
that said, the role that these statutes played in economic change remains
unclear.
Each changed the efﬁcient market solution to a problem of supply and
demand; that much is clear. Consider only two modest changes – the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Trust Indenture Act. Both were classic associationalist pieces of legislation based on its diagnosis of under-consumption
as the root of economic weakness and its penchant for picking up on unﬁnished Progressive causes. The ﬁrst created the rule requiring time-and-ahalf for overtime for certain groups of workers. After adoption it could be
expected that such a rule would, at the margin, make employers respond
to the opportunity to increase production by relying less on extending the
hours of existing workers and more on increasing total employment. At the
same time, the Fair Labor Standards Act’s adoption of a ﬁrm rule worked
toward minimizing the old problem of whether employers unfairly coerced
employees to work long hours. The Trust Indenture Act yoked old problems
even more directly to new objectives by establishing rules dictating “fairer”
terms in the indentures that governed bond issues with respect to trustee
selection, notice to bondholders, and their consent to the restructuring of
bond obligations. Such statutory provisions were expected, again at the
margin, to increase the willingness of investors to purchase bonds because
they knew that their interests were better protected. However, the change
in the efﬁcient market solution to a problem of supply and demand at a
hypothetical margin is like a tree falling in the forest unheard. Unless that
margin is reached, legal change changes nothing in the economy. What
passage of the law means is that a set of structures have been put into place
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that may or may not become relevant under future economic conditions,
dependent as they are on future political, technological, even demographic
occurrences.
But to notice the structural element in such legislation is to bring to
the forefront the matter of the degree to which the New Deal statutory
reforms enacted the associationalist economy. Here the answer is a resolute
negative. The creation of potentially efﬁcacious institutional structures is
not enough to “enact” an economy. Consider the possibility that, contrary
to fact, World War II had ended with a long-term truce among four or ﬁve
countries whose manufacturing capacity remained in good shape and so
whose economies competed vigorously. There is little reason to believe that
in such circumstances, circumstances in which relative insulation from the
world economy would decrease as air and ocean transportation improved,
the margin where any of these statutes would bite would ever be reached.
These laws might well have been of antiquarian interest, but little else.
Indeed, their notoriety today is a function of the fact that at some point
action within the institutions that they created actually took place, that the
economic relations that they made possible came to pass.
Note, however, that even though a change of behavior at the margin
may never take place, a change in legal entitlements may easily work a
change in the distribution of economic resources. The Fair Labor Standards
Act immediately made some employees wealthier, those whose wage gains
were less than the cost of hiring additional employees, especially where
slack demand or capacity constraints effectively turned the choice to hire
additional employees into the choice to begin a second shift. And this
increase in disposable income of individual workers may well have been
enough to alter, as always at the margin, the efﬁcient market solution to
other questions of supply and demand, most obviously those of clothing,
food, and housing. But such an alteration is no more a change in an economy
than would be the modest change in the market for legal services brought
on by adoption of the Trust Indenture Act. Law changes lots of things in
the details of economic life for the participants without bringing about a
transformation of the economy from one enacted understanding of economic
life to another.
II. THE FORTIES AND FIFTIES: ASSOCIATIONALISM AT WORK

Wartime mobilization and then production pulled the economy out of the
Depression in ways that all the thinking and writing of economists and
all the action of politicians could not manage. By taxing some, borrowing
much, and spending it all to win the war, the United States adopted a
Keynesian solution to its economic problems, but out of necessity, not out
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of theoretical understanding, for such a theoretical solution was still rejected
by most economists, as it had been during the Depression.
Total war meant that there were jobs for virtually everyone not actively
engaged in the armed forces. However, the rationing and price controlling
of most consumer products, combined with the termination of production of other products, meant that wartime wages were, by default, largely
saved. The technological innovations that the war spawned were notable –
synthetic rubber, radar, sonar, separation of uranium isotopes using the hexaﬂuoride compound, and the vacuum-tube-dependent ENIAC computer –
but changed the lives of Americans very little during those years. Much
more signiﬁcant was the wartime spread of military installations and, to a
lesser extent, war production plants, in the South and West that over time
began to break the agriculturally based colonial economy of the former and
the natural resources and agriculture based colonial economy of the latter.
Wartime economic practice continued to support the associationalist
bent of the economic/legal understanding of the period that preceded it.
Given the inﬂationary pressures that came with a sharp growth in total
wages and the wartime price control mechanism that was designed to deal
with those pressures, the existing structure of commercial relations was, if
anything, reinforced. Not only did the large, established ﬁrms that secured
the greatest portion of war-related contracts prosper, but also ﬁrm prices
on rationed goods meant that small units of production and distribution
prospered as well. The war may not have been won on Main Street, but Main
Street prospered as much or more that it had in the very brief euphoria that
was the economy of the twenties.
Labor also prospered. Though wage increases were drastically limited
under the War Labor Board’s fabled “Little Steel formula,” at least union
recognition and bargaining over working conditions were ensured. Strikes,
like wages, were limited, at least in theory. In practice the incidence of strikes
increased over the course of the war. However, out of the wartime experience
both labor and management started down the road toward understanding
that the country preferred industrial peace at a modest price. Acceptable
were increased costs from modest wage increases, from the introduction of
non-wage beneﬁts, from the recognition of work rules that kept production
expensive but labor less onerous (a covert form of a wage increase), and from
the proliferation of by law guaranteed time-and-a-half overtime, the major
source of increased prosperity for workers.
Overseas, American aircraft were attempting to destroy both European
and Japanese industrial might while allied diplomats planned for a postwar
international order, efforts that at Dumbarton Oaks led to the creation of
the United Nations and at Bretton Woods to the outline of a new economic
order. The Bretton Woods agreements reestablished the ﬁxed rate regime for
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foreign exchange that Roosevelt had interred when he took the United States
off the gold standard in 1933. Under the Bretton Woods gold exchange
standard, the United States agreed to exchange dollars for gold, but only
in transactions with foreign central banks, at a rate of $35 per ounce. The
currencies of the other states that participated in the system were then tied to
the dollar or gold at ﬁxed rates, and states agreed to maintain their currency
within a band (generally, 1 percent) of the ﬁxed rate. The International
Monetary Fund, also established at Bretton Woods, was designed to lend
money to states that had insufﬁcient gold or foreign currency reserves to
keep the actual value of their currency at the agreed-on rate, usually because
of an inability to cover their trade deﬁcits.
At the end of the war, Europe, even victorious Great Britain, was prostrate
with a combination of signiﬁcant population loss, destruction or exhaustion of industrial plant and equipment, destruction of infrastructure, and
removal of captive sources of raw materials. Indeed, the destruction had
been so severe that economic conditions throughout the continent were
worse in 1947 than they had been in 1945. Only with the Communist
takeovers of countries in Eastern Europe did economic conditions begin to
pick up when, in response, the United States began to pour into Western
Europe economic aid under the Marshall Plan and military aid, always a
prop to an economy, under NATO. Still, even with all this aid, Europe and
comparatively less aided Japan were restarting their economies from a very
low level.
In contrast, the United States had won all the marbles. As the only
truly functioning major economy north of the equator, it held virtually all
economic power in its hands and thought that it held all political power as
well. Like Julius Caesar, it bestrode “the narrow world like a Colossus.” The
returning GIs cared little about such things, however; they needed jobs.
Their needs brought about the replacement of women workers with men
in many of the best paying jobs, though only a temporary decline in female
participation in the waged workforce. The development of an ideology in
support of this maneuver exalted the notion of the one-wage-earner family
supported by a “family wage.” Although the decline of overtime in the
immediate post-war years initially made the notion of the family wage quite
difﬁcult to achieve, the GI Bill, for a time at least, served to sop up much
potential unemployment, with its extension of beneﬁts for servicemen who
sought further education, particularly higher education, which the colleges
were quick to supply.
Immediately after the war, the rise in consumer demand – fueled ﬁrst
by the simple absence of goods and services during the war, second by the
disproportionately large savings that were accumulated in those years when
high wages could ﬁnd few goods to purchase, and ﬁnally by the developing
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baby boom – brought signiﬁcant inﬂation. But by 1947 inﬂation subsided,
with only a modest spurt in 1950 associated with the onset of the Korean
War. Housing and autos then led the postwar economic expansion. In
addition, the United States was exporting goods, including farm products,
at a very high level. These exports earned large, if not wholly meaningful,
trade surpluses; they were ﬁnanced with aid or credit from the federal
government, for there was little that European countries and Japan had to
export.
America’s military and economic spending in Europe, the same kind
that drove the American economy during the war, was modestly helpful
in supporting domestic postwar expansion. The reintroduction of wartime
production that accompanied the Korean War meant that large-scale government stimulation of the economy returned for the better part of four
years; it was accompanied by another dose of somewhat less generous GI
Bill beneﬁts. But Korea was not fought under conditions of “total war.”
This time consumption was not particularly squeezed as a result of war
mobilization.
The economy grew strongly during these war years and continued its
growth into its next decade. Purchasing power was reasonably stable after
1950; capital, reasonably plentiful; consumer goods, everywhere to be
found; foreign sales, large. Only agriculture seemed to lag. Farm employment continued its wartime decline; farm size, its wartime increase; farm
income, its relative stagnation. This is not to say that in urban areas the
great postwar expansion was inexorably upward. Indeed, there were three
modest recessions during the chronological ﬁfties, the last coming at the
end of the decade and contributing to the election of a Democratic administration in 1960. But these were rightly seen as good years by consumers,
wage earners, and businessmen, fueled, as they were, by the insulation of
the domestic economy from international competition originating in the
still recovering European and Japanese economies and by the interaction
of this insulation with the practices of the associationalist legal/economic
model of a good economy.
The lack of international competition meant that American industry
could raise wages and easily pay for such wage increases by raising prices
modestly, relying on increases in demand to lower unit costs, and by deferring improvements in production processes, plant, and equipment. Nor was
there any internal need to do otherwise. Industry-wide bargaining meant
that competitors were seldom differentially disadvantaged by increases in
wages, increases that to some extent may have reﬂected productivity gains.
The prices of non-labor product inputs were reasonably steady, and domestic
companies controlled access to most raw materials, particularly petroleum,
at low world prices. And stockholders were a quiescent, dispersed lot, as
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Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means had observed a generation earlier, who
looked primarily for predictable dividends and less for capital appreciation.
Disgruntled investors sold; they did not ﬁght management.
The continued authority of the associationalist ideal of managed, rather
than ruinous, competition seemingly protected retail business owners,
though here the development of new national chains, such as McDonald’s
and Holiday Inn, and the expansion of discounting beyond groceries into
hard goods ought to have given careful observers pause. And that ideal
similarly protected members of the numerous oligopolistic industries by
limiting them to “gloves on” competitive ﬁghts for market share. American
industry had become big, cumbrous, comfortable, and more dependent
for its prosperity on the gross level of demand derived from increases
in total employment than on product improvement derived from capital
investment.
In some ways the quiescent state of American industry in these years
is somewhat counterintuitive. At the same time that producers were insulated from international competition to their products, capital costs were
unusually low because the United States maintained a sheltered market in
credit growing out of the structure that New Deal legislation left behind.
Checking account demand deposits were largely limited to corporations and
upper- or upper-middle-class families, and there were few equally liquid
investments offered elsewhere. Securities were effectively purchased by a
similarly limited group, due in part to high and ﬁxed minimum brokerage
commissions and in part to a lingering fear of the stock market that many
middle-class people had learned from the Great Crash. Savings for most
people were channeled into time deposit savings accounts, often at savings
and loan associations that were statutorily limited to paying low rates of
interest – 2 or 3 percent for most of these years – and similarly limited in
their investment of these funds to home mortgages, often insured under
the FHA or the GI bill. This segmentation of the national pool of savings
provided support for the housing markets, as well as a pile of corporate
bank balances available for lending to corporate borrowers at rates that
were secure from serious competition from the long-term, debt-oriented
securities markets.
One might have expected that the relatively low cost of credit would
have brought forth a torrent of investment in new product development,
old product innovation, and improvement of production processes to make
up for the lack of such investment since 1929. But this did not happen on a
grand scale. Innovation was obvious in the mass production of the primarily
suburban, new housing modeled on Levittown and in air conditioning,
television, and stereo. But the results of a lack of innovation were also already
evident. In iron and steel, little signiﬁcant investment in new processes
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was made after the Korean War. In rails, new investment was limited to
replacing steam with diesel power. This obvious improvement in technology
drew attention away from the continuing decline in demand, both in terms
of passengers and freight, that the boom in heavy transport during World
War II had obscured. Passenger rail travel declined with the proliferation of
private autos and later with the growth of business air travel; freight declined
with the increasing availability of truck transport, a circumstance obvious
even before the war. Indeed, the plans for what became the Eisenhower
Interstate Highway System in 1957 were ﬁrst drafted in 1941. At that
time the proposal was advanced on precisely the twin grounds successfully
offered sixteen years later – national defense and highway congestion from
increasing truck trafﬁc.
The social consequence of what in retrospect was a hot-house economy,
insulated from competition abroad and limited in competitive pressures at
home, was a dramatic increase in the middle class, both white collar and
blue. This larger middle class was built on three things: reasonably high
wages; low housing costs, aided by the nationwide adoption of the fully
amortizable, thirty-year mortgage (introduced on a mass scale by federal
agencies during the Depression) available at interest rates intentionally
kept low by the structure of banking regulation and effectively lowered
even further by the tax deductibility of mortgage interest in a time of high
marginal tax rates; and the extension of college education – more a matter
of increasing status than improving skills – to groups that previously would
never have been able to afford it. This was the “Quiet Generation,” quiet
because times were good and families needed building.
These new, middle-class Americans, still segregated by income, sought to
leave their familiar urban neighborhoods for the suburbs. Their reasons for
doing so were many and conﬂicting. They sought to escape the rising tide of
black migration to Northern cities that had picked up during the war and
further increased with changes in Southern agricultural practices, such as
the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, that made the sharecropper’s or tenant farmer’s already precarious livelihood even more fragile. They
also sought to escape the family pressure that was omnipresent in old ethnic neighborhoods of multiple family dwellings wedged closely together.
Especially, they hoped to fulﬁll that quintessential American dream, sold
endlessly in the popular press as well as by producer advertising, of owning
one’s own home. In their separate suburban enclaves, often still as separated by ethnicity, as well as race, as were their old neighborhoods, these
individuals created a middle class that was both different from that of the
classic bourgeois shopkeeper or professional of nineteenth-century Europe
and America or from that of the salaried middle management ubiquitous
in corporate life since the latter part of that century, and far larger in scope
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than had ever been seen before. They were the ﬁrst wage-earner middle
class.
Meanwhile, the combination of Marshall Plan aid and NATO-related
expenditures in Europe and similar economic aid and Korean-War-related
expenditures in Japan, plus low domestic defense expenditures in both areas
and incredibly high savings rates in Japan meant ﬁrst slow, then explosive
growth in the mid-ﬁfties. As a result of this growth, the American balance of
trade, the measure of current exports as against imports, which had regularly
shown a surplus, began to decline. Consequently, given the continuation of
governmental expenditures abroad, largely military after economic aid was
ended in the early ﬁfties, the declining positive balance of trade allowed
the development of a negative balance of payments, the measure of total
currency and gold outﬂows as against inﬂows.
Initially, that negative balance of payments was good for a world economy
that was short of payment reserves. It allowed foreign countries to build
up reserves, particularly of dollars, the reserve currency of choice. However,
by the late ﬁfties, what was once a good thing and remained so because
an increase in reserves was essential for ﬁnancing the continuing growth
in international trade, given that a sufﬁcient increase in the gold supply
was not forthcoming, also came to be seen as troublesome. The ﬁrst call
on the American gold reserve was as fractional backing for the dollar as a
domestic currency. The balance of the reserve was, under the gold exchange
standard, held to guarantee the American pledge to redeem in gold the
dollar holdings of foreign governments at the $35 per ounce ratio set by
the Bretton Woods agreements. This guarantee of redemption was ﬁne, so
long as no foreign government sought to exercise the right to redeem its
dollar holdings. Unfortunately, foreign governments did just that, and the
gold reserve slowly was being depleted.
With outstanding dollar reserves exceeding the gold available to back
them, the possibility that someone would be left without a chair when
the music stopped began to worry foreign governments. These governments feared that the United States would devalue its currency, unilaterally
increasing the price of gold and hence the amount of foreign dollar holdings required to be exchanged for a given amount of gold. At the same
time, the U.S. government feared that devaluing the dollar would both
spark domestic inﬂation and bring about an international economic crisis
that could undermine the strength of the anti-Communist coalition that
seemed essential for Western security. Thus began a period of intense ofﬁcial concern about the balance of trade, balance of payments, dollar outﬂow,
current account, and other measures of a “problem” that most Americans
couldn’t understand, in part because the language used to describe the
problem was so multifarious.
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The ﬁrst concrete and separable manifestation of that problem came in
the early sixties. With the gradual opening of capital markets worldwide,
European companies discovered that they could take advantage of a regulated American banking market that, because of the New Deal reforms,
kept capital costs low in the United States, signiﬁcantly lower than they
were in Europe. These companies would borrow dollars in New York and
use them to pay for capital investments abroad. Such a sensible business
strategy had the obvious effect of increasing the supply of dollars abroad, a
private outﬂow of capital on top of the governmental outﬂow for military
and aid purposes, and so of increasing the balance of payments deﬁcit and
concomitant worries about the American gold reserve. In 1962, in an effort
to reduce that outﬂow and the accompanying worries, the Kennedy administration introduced the interest equalization tax. This tax was designed to
increase the effective interest rate on bonds denominated in dollars and sold
in the United States by foreign borrowers to the interest rate that would
have been paid on similar bonds had they been sold in foreign markets, and
so to discourage the issuance of such bonds, by taxing American purchasers
of the bonds.
The temporary success of this tax strategy is far less important to understanding the American economy in the immediate postwar period than two
other things. First, the need to impose the tax serves to mark a signiﬁcant
change in that economy. For the ﬁrst time in more than twenty years international economic activities were having a negative impact on management
of the American economy. The interest equalization tax afﬁrmed, though
no one understood this at the time, that the United States was no longer
an economic island. Domestic economic policies would thereafter have to
be recognized as having international effects and foreign economic policies
recognized as having domestic economic effects.
Second, although the imposition of the equalization tax largely ended
the market for bonds denominated in dollars and sold in the United States
by foreign borrowers, it did not dampen the demand of foreign corporations
for dollar-denominated loans. Governments may have been worried about
the American balance of payments, but borrowers were not. So, the market
merely moved elsewhere – to the Eurodollar market, which is to say, really
nowhere. That market, apparently born in the mid-ﬁfties when the Russian
government wanted a place to keep its dollar earnings where the American
government could not conﬁscate them, lends dollars deposited in banks
located in various countries in which the dollar is not the national currency.
Somewhat unaccountably, such deposits are not subject to bank reserve
requirements, which means that these lenders can offer lower interest rates
than would be asked for loans in their various national currencies. Though
such rates were not as low as American rates, the difference was still sufﬁcient
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to be attractive to European borrowers, and so in time these deposits grew
enormously. The growth of this market afﬁrmed the dollar’s central role in
trade and investment worldwide, and, paradoxically, its role as an effective
reserve currency, even as governments were worried about its “soundness.”
After all, the United States was still the largest economy in the world.
Law and Economic Change: A Second Interrogation
The most obvious indication that one is confronting an economy in full
bloom, as it were, is that as one tries to tell its story there is almost nothing
to talk about for there is almost nothing going on. The economic actors
have settled into playing the economic roles that the economy seems to
assume that they will play. Law is quite silent as well. Such is the case with
the associationalist economy of the ﬁfties.
After the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, there is but one
signiﬁcant piece of economic legislation in the succeeding ﬁfteen years –
the Interstate Highway Act of 1957. And that piece of legislation is more
of a reﬂection of the impatience of the enlarged middle class with the limits
on their ability to use their big cars and leisure time, their two weeks of paid
vacation, than a reﬂection of any troubles that would cause those harmed to
run to law for its uncertain succor. All of this is not to say that the organs
of law shut down during these years. Rather, the legislative product – the
expansion of the rice support program to two more counties in Arkansas
where the existence of such support made it newly plausible to grow rice or
the creation of a public authority to extend an airport or maintain a port –
was so trivial as to beggar the mind.
The relative silence of law is, of course, misleading. Narrowly conceived
as just the formal and effective norms originating from governmental entities, especially the law of property, contract and theft, of mine and thine,
law is always there, the modest hum of a faithful dynamo. Looking at law
more broadly conceived, as the many and variable actions undertaken by
governmental actors, of discretionary action, as the traditional language
of the law would have it, the matter is pretty much the same. Because in
an enacted economy the formal and effective structures are pretty much in
place, the work of the bureaucracy goes about its modest regulatory business
constantly, but quietly. Yes, noise is always heard from narrowly interested
parties and that noise bulks large in the business press, but when looked back
on, tempests and teapots come readily to mind. This is the real signiﬁcance
of the interest equalization tax, buried as it was in an otherwise ordinary
omnibus tax bill. Law was ﬁnally roused from its quiet work to attend to
what in the longer run turned out to be a signiﬁcant problem. The associationalist economy was in trouble.
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III. THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES: A TROUBLED ECONOMY

For about the next twenty years, an increasingly troubled economy, centered
in the production of consumer and heavy industrial goods, alternately slid
and lurched down hill. How troubled? After the invasion of the Volkswagen
Beetle, it took a ﬂotilla of inexpensive Japanese imports to begin to knock
the automobile industry out of denying that its market had changed.
“Voluntary” export restraints entered into by Japanese manufacturers, designed to give the industry time to get back to its ﬁghting weight, seemed
not to help. Then there was the continuous decline of a steel industry that,
once deprived of the stimulus provided by the Vietnam War and plagued
with excess capacity devoted to an aged production process, ceded market
after market to substantially cheaper imports and domestic upstarts, even
while receiving trade protection. Similar stories might be told in the case of
textiles (again despite signiﬁcant trade protection), machine tools, clothing,
footwear, and, of course, the television set, that quintessential product of
the ﬁfties life and economy. Most of the areas in which signiﬁcant declines
did not occur were industries where comprehensive federal or state regulation was in place, such as aviation, banking, communications, power, and
securities. The only real growth industries in this period, other than entertainment, were real estate, plus the associated construction enterprises, and
higher education, plus the associated spinoffs from the production of technological research conducted in medicine, electronics, and other scienceand engineering-related ﬁelds.
How did this state of affairs come about? Initially, foreign manufactured
products were attractive simply because they were cheaper. The associationalist model of a high-wage, high-price economy made it difﬁcult for
newly prosperous younger and lower-middle-class consumers, the expanded
middle class that the ﬁfties economy brought into being, to afford many
things, especially small appliances and other electrical goods, or much of
many things that were affordable only in small amounts, mainly soft goods.
The discount stores that had begun to appear in the ﬁfties – stores like E. J.
Korvettes that sold American made hard goods at “discount” (i.e., less than
the high “list” prices charged by the small Main Street retailers) – soon
turned into specialty retailers, such as Pier 1, or into moderate-income
department stores, such as K-Mart, Ames, or Hills, that sold many foreignmade goods, ﬁrst soft goods, later small appliances, eventually electronics.
Now, these families could have more clothes in their closets and small,
inexpensive appliances in their kitchens; eventually they could have cheaper
electronics in their family rooms.
Foreign products, especially soft goods, small appliances, and consumer
electronics, often were cheaper simply because of wage rate disparities.
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For other products such as steel and autos, lower wages combined with
an unexpected advantage that derived from the wartime destruction of
industrial capacity in Europe and Japan. Overseas, once capital could be
assembled to revive these industries, capacity was built with the newest,
most efﬁcient technology and work processes – production methods in
advance of those existing in the United States. The combination of better
methods and lower wages was sufﬁcient to offset the quite signiﬁcant cost
of ocean freight for heavy, often bulky goods. Transportation costs for soft
goods, small appliances, and consumer electronics, when combined with loss
or damage from trans-shipping to boats and from boats to trains or trucks,
were a similarly signiﬁcant expense. But, in time, transportation costs for
these goods came down radically with the development of containerized
shipping and of ships designed for containerization.
Eventually, foreign manufactured products were attractive because they
were better. As foreign wages rose, ﬁrst in Europe and then in Japan, producers there relied on technological advances that reduced costs or on mass
production of new products – the Walkman stereo and the videocassette
recorder are the best known – often actually invented in the United States.
Faced with persistent consumer demand for low- priced or relatively inexpensive newly available products, American companies, used to oligopolistic competition, were not able, or at least not willing, to compete. Their
response was to cede the low price market, as the steel industry had done, or
to move production overseas. In either case, American companies eventually shrank domestic manufacturing capacity. Only later was “automation,”
the choice to substitute increasingly sophisticated machines (often manufactured abroad) for labor power, tried and then only sometimes successfully.
Explaining this pattern of manufacturer behavior is difﬁcult. In some of
the heavily unionized sectors such as steel and autos, management – fat,
happy, and always inordinately concerned about its prerogatives; labor – a
relatively immobile factor of production that can be expected to ﬁght hard
to preserve jobs; and especially poor labor-management relations, forged
from the notion of quid pro quo, rather than the notion of joint problem
solving, bear some share of the responsibility. In other unionized and in nonunionized sectors, family and management ties to declining enterprises, a
sense of obligation toward local communities, possibly a sense of continuing
obligation to workers derived from their status as veterans, and of course
drift and default seem to have played a role. What is most signiﬁcant,
however, is that, in a surprisingly large number of cases, plant closure was
avoided for as long as possible. Such was the strength of the associationalist
model in the late sixties and seventies, long after it ceased its relevance to
America’s place in the world economy.
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While the dysfunctional post-ﬁfties American economy slid comfortably
downhill, ﬁve developments silently continued to transform the country.
The ﬁrst was the malling of suburbia. This process largely destroyed the
existing suburban versions of Main Street and continued the retail evacuation of the urban business core that had begun with the accelerated growth
of the suburbs in the ﬁfties, a development that only hastened the residential
evacuation of those same cities.
The second development accompanied the completion of the interstate
highway system. Initially, the existence of these highways magniﬁed the
evacuation of urban areas by their white, newly middle-class population.
Then, in the same way that the new highway system had opened large
tracts of land for residential development, it opened similar tracts for the
development of light industrial and expanding service employment, particularly in banking, insurance, and health care, all within easy reach of this
new suburban housing. Thereafter, jobs followed housing and housing jobs
in a reinforcing cycle that created new suburban communities. Unlike the
upper-middle-class suburbs of the twenties and thirties, these new suburbs
were surprisingly independent of the urban areas that had initially spawned
them.
The third development was the continuation of the evacuation of rural
America, especially the Midwestern breadbasket. Though federal subsidies
kept agriculture proﬁtable, as farms increased in scale to pay for increasingly expensive hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, and equipment, the farm
population declined. During these years, it was a real achievement for a
rural community simply to maintain its population, even with recruited
industrial employment, usually from ﬁrms attempting to escape a unionized work force, unless luck placed a growth industry – higher education
was the most obvious one – in the area.
The fourth development was the growth of the South and West. In the
South, the out-migration of blacks displaced by the mechanization of agriculture was offset by an even larger in-migration of Northerners escaping
declining industries and chasing manufacturing jobs that were ﬂeeing union
labor contracts. In the West, aerospace and other military-related jobs were
the draw. In both areas, the climate was made increasingly habitable by the
perfection of air conditioning. And, as cities grew, construction and service
jobs grew in tandem.
The ﬁfth development was a signiﬁcant change in the structure of the
American industrial ﬁrm. Traditionally, industrial corporations, vertically
integrated to a signiﬁcant extent, made one major product and a few
closely related ones. Such ﬁrms grew from the investment of retained earnings, either internally or by merger with other ﬁrms in the same industry. But in the sixties this type of growth by merger was stymied by the
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Celler-Kefauver amendments to the antitrust acts. Apparently responding
to this limit on growth, many American corporations began to use their
retained earnings, in the form of new issues of common stock, to purchase
strikingly diverse businesses, building what were called “conglomerates,”
the most famous being Harold Geneen’s ITT and James Ling’s LTV. This
innovation unfortunately coincided with a steep decline in average annual
increases in American productivity, from about 3 percent in the late ﬁfties
to nearly zero percent by the end of the seventies, and in corporate spending
for research and development. For the time being, it seemed as if the traditional industrial corporation, already under siege by foreign competitors,
would be succeeded by another form of industrial organization.
The slow slide of the American economy downhill that accompanied
these social and economic changes was occasionally interrupted by less gentle lurches toward the bottom. The ﬁrst such lurch followed from Lyndon
Johnson’s decision simultaneously to ﬁght a land war in Asia, build a Great
Society, and maintain the free importation of goods lest the American standard of living decline, but not to raise income taxes – a policy that Richard
Nixon continued, though by diverting Great Society expenditures, and
more than a few others, to the cause of Mars. Thus began a string of federal
governmental deﬁcits at a time when the economy was probably already
operating at full capacity.
Unfortunately, during these years the Federal Reserve had adopted a
policy of seeking regular growth in the money supply, further augmenting
that supply during each recession under the Keynesian theory, by then
generally accepted, that such action would lower interest rates and so expand
employment. The result was the beginning of the Great Inﬂation, lasting
close to a generation. By the time this event was over, it had reduced
the value of the dollar by about two-thirds and the real value of wages by
20 percent. The newly broadened middle class was being seriously squeezed
as interest rates increased signiﬁcantly, especially on home mortgages; as
the cost of common services, such as hair cuts and dry cleaning, not to
mention more complex services such a medical care, began to accelerate;
and as prices in the grocery and drug stores moved from a trot to a gallop.
The combination of inﬂation and a system of ﬁxed exchange rates occasioned the second lurch downhill. Domestic inﬂation meant that, from the
perspective of foreign buyers, American exports seemed more expensive;
from the perception of American buyers, foreign imports seemed cheap.
This disparity of perception led to a sharp deterioration in the American
balance of trade as foreign buyers cut back on the purchase of American
goods and American buyers clamored for more imported goods. Simultaneously, the further restrictions on the outﬂow of funds that were imposed
soon after the interest equalization tax not only failed to solve the American
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balance of payments problems, but those problems were augmented by the
increased overseas military spending occasioned by the Vietnam War. This
augmentation compounded the effects of the deterioration in the balance
of trade; foreign governments began quickly to convert their dollars into
gold. In 1971, fearing that continuation of the outﬂow of gold threatened
the “bankruptcy” of the country or, more properly, of the policy of guaranteeing the convertibility of dollars into gold at the ﬁxed rate established by
the Bretton Woods agreements, Richard Nixon, who had more than exacerbated the problem by intensifying the war in Southeast Asia, “temporarily”
refused to honor the nation’s commitment to exchange dollars for gold. Two
years later, when circumstances had not improved, he abandoned the gold
exchange standard entirely.
The demise of the gold exchange standard and its replacement with
a system of “ﬂoating” exchange rates involving the major international
currencies – rates determined in the market for foreign exchange and not
by the willingness of governments to exchange currency at stated rates –
was not the disaster for the world economy that many had feared it would
be. Indeed, like the interest equalization tax, the adoption of a ﬂoating
exchange rate may have been more a symbol of the continued decline of
the American island economy that had made possible the realization of the
associationalist ideal in the ﬁfties than of much practical signiﬁcance, given
that the dollar continued to be freely accepted as a medium of foreign trade
and indeed, as a reserve currency. But everyone expected that the short-term
consequence for the economy would be a further increase in inﬂation.
Recognizing this expectation, when Nixon closed the gold window in
1971, he simultaneously took the unprecedented step of instituting wage
and price controls in an allegedly peacetime economy. Such controls were
anything but unwelcome to the American people, unused as they were to
annual inﬂation rates of 6 or more percent. In addition to placing stress on
family budgets, such inﬂation even decreased disposable inﬂated income,
as wage increases were also eaten into by increases in marginal income tax
rates as a result of moving to higher tax brackets. Controls, progressively
weakened, were about as effective as could be expected, more so possibly
because they were not in force long enough to spawn a fully developed black
market.
Inﬂation, however, continued unabated. Indeed, next the economy experienced two more lurches toward the bottom, each accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in inﬂation. In 1973 came the Arab oil embargo that
followed the Yom Kippur War, which when lifted was accompanied by the
decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to
quadruple the price of oil. The unemployment rate hit 8.5 percent. Then,
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in 1978 came a second shock, that from the loss of access to Iranian oil in
the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and from the further OPEC price
rise that followed. Because the United States had become highly dependent
on importing countless tankers of now very expensive oil, its balance of
trade, already signiﬁcantly negative, declined precipitously, and soon the
world was awash with dollars.
Curiously, during these years, the most extraordinary – but usually unremarked – aspect of the American economy was the general inability of
economists and policymakers to explain persuasively, much less to act effectively to alter, the cumulative slide in that economy. How it came to be that
inﬂation did not bring economic growth, its traditional accompaniment,
but instead allowed the continuance of a relatively stagnant economy – the
dreaded “stagﬂation” – was a mystery. And not a pleasant one. The largest
economy in the world was in real trouble.
Law and Economic Change: A Third Interrogation
Watching an economy come apart is not likely to be a pretty sight, and the
disintegration of the associationalist economy during the sixties and seventies was no exception to this generalization. The bewildered, human pain
that followed as solid expectations of future life were completely unraveled – labor, management, adolescents, and old people alike in their pain,
though not in their loss – is perhaps the most characteristic aspect of these
years. Gasoline wasn’t supposed to cost a dollar a gallon; wages weren’t
supposed to lag behind inﬂation; imports weren’t supposed to threaten
established supports of community life. And this disorientation included
public life; America wasn’t supposed to be a pitiful, helpless giant suffering
from economic malaise, as Jimmy Carter learned to his dismay.
That the experts could make no sense of these events is an understatement.
Arthur Laffer could take a cocktail napkin, draw a curve on it that linked
declining income tax rates with increasing tax collections, and it became a
theory, somehow just as strong a theory as Milton Friedman’s theory about
changes in the growth of monetary aggregates and inﬂation, based as his
was on years of research in monetary history. Ideas for taming inﬂation as
sensible, but unprecedented, as Richard Nixon’s embrace of peacetime price
regulation and as silly as Gerald Ford’s distribution of WIN (Whip Inﬂation
Now) buttons were both worth a try because no one could understand what
was going on anyway. Maybe a conglomeration of companies was a good
idea if a group could be assembled so that the proﬁts of its component parts
experienced different temporal cycles, some always up when the others
were down, so that the company as a whole always would be proﬁtable. But
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then, maybe it was really dumb to assume that management by ﬁnancial
statement was better than management from the factory ﬂoor. Either was
obviously arguable.
Law understood no more than the humans who used it. People felt pain,
felt the times to be out of control, and so went to law in search of whatever
nostrums seemed plausible at a given time and place. Trade protection made
as much sense as did abandoning the gold standard as did reinvigorating
antitrust enforcement as did price control as did price decontrol as did the
strategic petroleum reserve as did airline price deregulation. As was the
case during the Depression, people were hurting, and so law responded in
such ways as the practical politics of the legislative process at that time and
place allowed.
But to mention airline deregulation, a piece of the puzzle that only ﬁt into
a, not the pattern years later, is to bring to the fore something very important
with respect to law and economic change. Although sensible people might
have understood that the associationalist economy was coming apart and
was not likely to be put together again, no one knew what kind of economy
was in our future or even when a new economy might come together. No set
of structures was put into place, intentionally or accidentally, that forged
the next economy, except in the sense that lots of structures were tried that
might or might not prove important depending on what happened next in
economic life. The two nostrums that proved to be harbingers of things to
come, the laughable Laffer curve and the deregulation of airline fares, do not
bulk particularly large in any sensible story of these years. Indeed, it is hard
to see exactly what the notion that raising the effective return on invested
capital would aid the economy had to do with the notion that reducing
price rigidity would have the same effect, except on the goofy theory, belied
by the good years that were the ﬁfties, that governmental regulation was
somehow always and everywhere an economic mistake.
IV. THE EIGHTIES AND NINETIES: BUILDING AN IMPATIENT
ECONOMY

One day in October 1979, Paul Volcker, newly chair of the Federal Reserve,
decided that he had had it with inﬂation. He convinced the Fed to scrap
the conventional wisdom; it would no longer increase the monetary supply
in order to stimulate the economy and would let interest rates rise and
fall as they pleased. Soon, interest rates hit sky-high levels, and in 1981
the country dropped into a deep recession that lasted for two years. The
unemployment rate reached 10 percent. About the same time, Ronald
Reagan both increased defense spending and cut taxes, producing enormous
deﬁcits in the federal budget. These actions helped pull the economy out
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of the recession that Volcker had created, once again proving that Keynes
was most useful to those who did not believe in his prescriptions.
When the recession was over, the Great Inﬂation was over as well. Apparently, the precipitous rise in nominal interest rates in the early eighties
interacted with a rise in real rates of return to boost the attractiveness of
investment in capital assets and bring a decline in the actual rate of inﬂation.
Such assets, especially those implementing newly developed technologies
often related to computerization in both manufacturing and service industries, changed the structure of production. They tended either to increase
the entry-level skills needed to operate production processes and so widened
the gap between those skills, and the wages appropriate to them, and the
remaining grunt jobs, or, as was particularly the case in the service sector,
decreased the skill level and often the absolute number of entry-level jobs.
In either case, the associationalist model of the economy was undercut.
A similar undercutting was felt in diverse segments of the economy.
Among the ideas offered in the seventies to explain the dismal condition
of the economy was the proposition that it was rooted in excessive regulation. Although the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy –
communications, energy, and transportation – were few in number and
generally entailed only modest direct costs for industrial producers, and
the more lightly regulated sectors – banking and securities – arguably had
been a crucial economic engine during the ﬁfties by keeping capital costs
low, numerous legislative programs of deregulation were adopted during
these years. The effect of these programs was, however, mostly felt in the
eighties.
Examples are numerous. In air travel, ﬁrst came the disappearance of the
single- price airfare, always and at any time the same, and the proliferation
of cheap restricted fares, an event that helped airline trafﬁc grow into a
mass-market phenomenon in ways that it never had been before. Then came
bankruptcies, consolidation, and the development of a hub-and-spoke route
system that worked both to lower costs and to make new entry difﬁcult,
but allowed smaller niche players to emerge. A similar pattern developed
in both truck and rail transport: lower costs, fewer, larger ﬁrms as a result
of bankruptcy and merger, and small specialists. In all three areas a large,
government-stabilized cartel was succeeded by a smaller oligopoly.
In communication and ﬁnance the sequence was different and the time
frame longer, but the end point was much the same. First came lower prices –
the decline in long-distance rates and the abolition of ﬁxed commissions on
stock trades – and then a great proliferation in new services: call waiting
and cell phones, interest-bearing checking accounts, and automatic teller
machines. Eventually came consolidation into seeming oligopolies, though
in these cases less through bankruptcy and more through merger.
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The effect on the economy from deregulation was not quite what the
theory predicted. Prices did decline for most consumers, except for the
road warriors of corporate sales departments who shifted from long boring
rides in large comfortable cars ending at indifferent motel rooms to shorter
cramped ﬂights, boring waits in airports, and short drives in cramped rental
cars ending at indifferent motel rooms. More signiﬁcantly, however, in each
deregulated industry the product or service seemed to change over time.
The simplest example is rail and truck transport where the transformation of industry structure combined with the potential of computerization
to produce “just in time” manufacturing and retailing, a concept that significantly reduced inventory costs and eliminated dozens of local distributors.
Trucks, rail cars, and ocean freight containers, always on the move, in effect
became the inventory function, serving as rolling warehouses. Similarly, in
communication ﬁrst the fax machine, then the dial-up modem, and ﬁnally
cable and wireless technology, again combined with the potential of computerization, transformed the humble phone call into something else – a
document delivery service, an information-retrieval mechanism, a “realtime” ﬁnancial transactions network. These changes transformed the phone
into bandwidth to be used for purposes essentially unrelated to inviting
neighbors over for dinner and a friendly game of cards. Likewise in banking
and securities, the proliferation of products that are neither deposit taking nor lending nor the purchase and sale of debt or equity interests in
business entities – bank cards, money market mutual funds, securitization,
currency hedging, interest rate swaps – have created what can be seen as a
new industry, rather grandiosely called ﬁnancial services.
A signiﬁcant portion of the economic growth in the late eighties and
nineties came in these areas, though not without costs, often enormous,
for the political process failed to realize that regulation creates patterns of
investment, and so of personal commitment, that are upset when regulation
is removed. In the securities industry predictable and promising careers
ended and famous ﬁrms were swallowed whole, as competition created the
need for new products and new skills. In railroads, the casualties were other
industries that, and people who, had located in particular places and there
depended on the existence of a particular mode of transportation that was
no longer economical to maintain and so disappeared.
In bank regulation the matter was more complicated and ultimately
expensive, but again had its roots in the seventies. The Great Inﬂation
brought an enormous increase in unregulated interest rates. Soon there were
complaints across the land that savings deposits were “eroding” because they
were earning a regulated low return, a rate far below the rate of inﬂation. To
make matters worse, the development of the money market mutual fund, a
device that invested cash in short-term Treasury obligations and similar
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debt instruments of the most credit-worthy commercial borrowers –
commercial paper – offered savers a heftier return than could savings
accounts, because the rates on these investments were not regulated. In
pursuit of such returns, savings poured out of deposit institutions. Savings
and loans found that they lacked money for making new mortgages. Banks
found that demand for corporate loans had declined as corporate treasurers
issued the commercial paper that the money market funds craved, rather
than visiting their local banker.
The initial governmental response to this problem was to allow commercial banks to offer interest on checking accounts and the savings and loan
industry to offer higher rates on its deposits. The banks, left with a riskier
portfolio of loans made to borrowers whose credit was not good enough for
the commercial paper market, moved heavily into fee-generating business
to pay for the now more expensive deposits. The savings and loans had
a more embedded problem; the interest rates they were now paying for
deposits were substantially higher than the interest rates on the portfolio
of thirty-year mortgages they had made over time and still held. Thus,
although these institutions had funds to loan, they were losing money with
each transaction. Two changes followed.
The ﬁrst was a great success, the invention of the collateralized mortgage
obligation (CMO). Financial institutions would sell their mortgages to the
New Deal’s federal mortgage organizations – the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae). These organizations had long sold their own bonds to provide funds
that could be lent to the providers of home mortgages. Now they began to
issue similar securities, CMOs, with their own, extremely valuable guarantee and moreover collateralized by the newly purchased mortgages. This
set of transactions allowed ﬁnancial institutions to shift the risk of owning
mortgages with ﬁxed long-term rates to institutions with less sensitivity
to interest-rate shifts, such as pension plans and insurance companies.
The other was anything but a success. In the name of maintaining fairness between different types of ﬁnancial institutions, savings and loans were
permitted to engage in lending other than home mortgages with the hope
that they would earn the greater returns that those forms of lending provided. This decision was followed by the savings and loan crisis of the late
eighties, as savings and loans around the country folded because of bad,
occasionally even corrupt, investments or continuing “negative spreads”
between deposit interest rates and mortgage portfolio returns, or both. The
Treasury paid out billions on the claims presented by depositors who lost
their savings in the process, an obligation that derived from the provision
of deposit insurance, one of the little programs of the New Deal that had

590

John Henry Schlegel

successfully enticed deposits back into a banking system that had imploded
in the twenties and thirties.
Deregulation was, however, only a part of what was going on in the
economy in the eighties and nineties. Much of the rest was the continued
destruction of the economic model that had made the ﬁfties economy such
a spectacular thing, probably by accident, by being the right model for that
particularly unforeseeable time. Increasingly, the associationalist model of
high prices, high wages, and lifetime employment, at least for white-collar
workers, came undone in a range of industries, whether trade protected
or not. Copper, tires, textiles, clothing, shoes, televisions, stereos, dishes,
glassware, cookware, watches, pens, and even telephones slowly became
mostly imported products; autos, somewhat less. Manufacturers continued the process of ﬁrst conceding the low-end products, then the oldest
manufacturing facilities, and ﬁnally whole markets.
In some areas technological innovation or the development of new
processes entirely – steel mini-mills using scrap for feedstock is a good
example – kept parts of old industries alive. But more than occasionally,
these were markets where manufacturing costs were not yet matched by
foreign producers. In still other markets, a slimmed-down industry survived in niches – autos that are particularly designed for the odd tastes
of the American consumer or specialty steels. What was left behind was a
landscape surprisingly denuded of former industrial icons, except for a few
long-term survivors. IBM, as well as Boeing and the rest of the aerospace
industry, are the most obvious; General Motors and Ford, the most recurrently troubled. Even the conglomerate alternative to the ﬁfties industrial
behemoths passed from the scene, a victim of the eighties junk bond craze
that facilitated busting up such entities for fun and proﬁt.
As one examines this record of the decline of heavy industry, it becomes
apparent that the broad increase in the standard of living that took place in
the ﬁfties and early sixties has been America’s own version of the winner’s
curse. Although Americans have always searched for new markets and so
have been alive to the world of international trade, free trade, and thus the
idea of comparative national advantage, has been a more central part of the
national consciousness since World War II. Free trade, really freer trade,
was to be a way to avoid the recurrence of the Depression, to unite nations
by means of growing mutual dependency, and to provide an object lesson
for the Third World of the beneﬁts of “open” economies, in contrast to the
“closed” Communist economies in Eastern Europe and Asia. Foreign policy
thus supported freer trade, though at times domestic considerations made
freer trade look more like trade managed for strategic national advantage.
Freer trade interacted with the American standard of living in a crucial
way. As the United States became less of an island, less capable of standing
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separately, maintaining the standard of living that was built in a high-wage,
high-price economy became more difﬁcult. In response to that difﬁculty,
Americans, ﬁghting to remain a part of the enlarged middle class, did
many things. They drastically curbed saving. They supported tax reduction,
borrowing from an uncertain future. They chose to try to stretch the dollar
by working harder; the growth of the two wage-earner household during
the seventies and eighties surely cushioned economic decline for families
who found that local industrial jobs had disappeared. And they found it
easy to continue to accept, indeed to increase their acceptance of, lower cost
imports from an international arena with which they were familiar and in
which they were comfortable, if not wholly dominant. That arena became
the source for the goods that were necessary for membership in the lower
middle class and above.
Of course, because of America’s economic dependence on imported oil –
environmental concerns, again a part of a middle-class standard of living,
have kept coal and nuclear power from being winners – and because of
American’s addiction to computers and consumer electronics, there was
really no other plausible choice than freer trade. Letting the dollar become
a reserve currency, indeed even exulting in its becoming such, was, like
the middle-class standard of living, a mixed blessing. It made trade easy,
but it made investment easy as well. The interest equalization tax had a
hidden lesson in it. Capital does seek its highest returns consistent with its
tolerance for risk.
Once the value of major currencies was no longer tied to a stock of
gold, numerous investment opportunities, denominated in various currencies, became real alternatives. Looked at critically, returns on investments
denominated in dollars simply did not stand up to those available elsewhere. And so, those American ﬁrms that could move their funds around
the world found that more promising investments in plant and equipment
were to be had elsewhere. Often these investments were made simply in
pursuit of lower labor costs. At other times, investments were in new production processes, especially those substituting lighter weight components
for heavier, since the modest increase in the cost of production was less
than the decrease in the cost of ocean freight and so the resulting product
was still salable in the United States. Though investment in new plant
and equipment was concentrated elsewhere, buying was still an available
alternative for middle-class Americans addicted to their standard of living;
increasingly, manufacturing was not.
There was, as often is the case, a counter-current. Ours was still the
largest economy in the world, though the expanding European Union was
trying to overtake us. Our addiction to a ﬁfties standard of living maintained with imported goods meant that foreign producers rapidly acquired

592

John Henry Schlegel

great piles of dollars, for most the reserve currency of choice. Those earnings
had to go somewhere. Mattresses were implausible and conversion to foreign currencies would only result in a decrease in the value of the earnings.
So, many producers of imported goods used their dollars to make portfolio investments in New York, the largest and deepest securities market in
the world; to purchase tangible American assets, such as real estate, still
viable manufacturing companies, or almost any service business; or to duplicate their existing, overseas plant and equipment in the States, thus saving
the transportation costs otherwise inherent in serving our market and simultaneously making their products more attractive to American customers.
Oddly, what seemed to many observers to be a dangerous tendency to live
well beyond our means proved to be not even a half-bad experience for many
Americans.
As the remnants of the ﬁfties economy were being destroyed, a successor economy was growing, developed out of America’s real economic
strength – higher education. Computers and their software, pharmaceuticals, health care products, electronic technology spinoffs from defense industries, advanced engineering processes – all were high-growth, high-return
industries right here in America; all were signiﬁcant sources of exports as
well. It seemed as if Americans were going to do the world’s research and
development. Production was another matter. All major (and a surprising
percentage of minor) American corporations purveying consumer or industrial goods had built or acquired many international facilities capable of
producing goods for local markets and for export to the United States.
Production would increasingly be done elsewhere.
Another source of growth was in the continuing expansion of service
industries: banking, insurance, real estate, health care, “hospitality,” travel,
and government. This was particularly true in the South and West, areas that
had already increased their light-manufacturing base and so could support
a similarly increased population. In Florida and in the Southwest, where the
natives had expanded water supplies through transport by canal, growing
numbers of retirees fueled still larger increases in the size of the service economy. In a real sense, service jobs too were a product of the American system of
education, though not necessarily one to be proud of, ﬁlled as they were by a
small number of college and professional degree holders and a large number
of others who at best held associates degrees and were paid accordingly.
These examples of growth were obvious in that other notable product
of the American educational system – the ﬁnancial services industry. The
proliferation of new and modestly useful ﬁnancial products coming out of
Wall Street’s version of Hollywood’s dream factories that took advantage
of the breadth and depth of the American capital markets and tapped into
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international markets as well made many men (but few women) rich. In
the process, the ﬁnancial engineering that Wall Street delivered to the various “institutions” that increasingly came to dominate American ﬁnancial
markets – insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, the private
foundations of the wealthy, university endowments and, let us not forget,
hedge funds – transformed the ﬁnancial landscape. Where once a solid dividend record was all that counted when measuring a stock’s attractiveness,
now institutions – many so large that they would ﬁnd it very hard to sell
their holdings in any given stock and others limited in their ability to
do so by their choice to pursue indexing as an investment strategy – gave
attractiveness an entirely new dimension, a dimension derived from the
new high-growth, high-return industries. Total return, the sum of dividends received and stock appreciation, was now the measure of investment
success, that and steady earnings growth. All one heard was the demand for
“increasing shareholder value,” a euphemism for raising a company’s stock
price.
So, at the end of the nineties the United States seemed to be left with an
economy that consisted of the products of the American system of higher
education; those things that were too heavy and too inexpensive to be
effectively made and shipped from overseas; services that had to be delivered
locally including construction; entertainment, always a viable industry for
any cultural hegemon; autos, an industry kept alive by the growth of foreign
manufacturers who, afraid of trade protection legislation, chose to use proﬁts
earned here to create plants producing for a market once served from abroad;
and the sale of the myriad products that made up a middle-class lifestyle.
While some argued that the industries reborn by deregulation had to be
added to this list, it seemed more likely that, just as had proven to be the
case with truck and rail transportation, unless the deregulated industries
were tied to the products of the American system of higher education, their
growth would prove to have represented one-time opportunities as, over
time, the American preference for oligopolistic competition – a modest
possibility of price control derived from branding and economies of scale,
coupled with an endless fear of a competitor’s “breakout” innovation –
asserted itself.
To know something is to be able to name it. If the ﬁfties instantiated
an associationalist economy, what name properly describes the American
economy at the end of the nineties? The decade did not see a return to the
laissez-faire capitalism thought to have gripped the United States in the
1890s. For all the complaints about the costs of regulation, environmental,
food and drug, labor relations, occupational safety, pension, product safety,
securities, and wage and hour protections did not wholly disappear. Social
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Security and Medicare, as well as unemployment, bank deposit, pension,
and brokerage failure insurance survived as well. The economy did not
emulate the Gilded Age ﬁnanciers and break into an orgy of unrestrained,
to-the-death competition. Nor is it likely that it will. Oligopoly is too
much a part of the American and world experience now.
To understand the economy that emerged from the nineties, it is important to notice how, during the decade, ﬁnancial markets became incredibly
disciplining. Companies had to deliver ever higher total returns on capital
based on steady, predictable earnings growth or face pressure to cut losses
quickly. This was an unforgiving economy, an economy where people with
the labor market skills of the hour were pampered as never before, but
only for as long as their star shone brightest. No longer associationalist, the
American economy had become an impatient economy.
The associationalist economy promised that economic growth would
increase the availability of leisure; in response, some commentators even
began to worry that so much leisure time would become a social problem.
In the early twenty-ﬁrst century all that is past; now there is no leisure time
until retirement. The communications revolution means that the global
stock market, which operates around the clock, can be checked at any time in
the day or night while on safari in Africa. First, courier largely replaced real
mail; in turn courier was replaced by fax; currently the on-time standards
are email and text messaging, available essentially anywhere, anytime by
mobile phone. Coast-to-coast and intercontinental ﬂights are staples of
commerce, where once the pace of train and ocean travel – both with real
sleep caught on the way – was a break from the daily routine. Financial
markets are driven, not by earnings trends, but by quarterly earnings, or
even expectations about quarterly earnings; by expectations about the next
Fed Open Market Committee meeting and not by the results of the meeting
itself. The best production process is a “just in time” production process.
Yes, in the early twenty-ﬁrst century the American economy is an impatient
economy.
V. EXAMINING A LOOSELY WOVEN FABRIC: SEEKING LAW
IN ECONOMIC CHANGE

Whether one focuses on the details of economic life – dominant industries,
modes of transportation, consumer products – or on larger scale phenomena – the expansion of the consumerist middle class, the shift in sectional
economies, the decline of the American island economy – or on the highest
level of generality – an economy as a whole, a persistent market structure
that fuses an understanding of economic life with patterns of behavior within
economic, political, and social institutions, an associationalist or impatient
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economy – the short twentieth century has been a time of signiﬁcant economic change. As such it is plausible to examine the role of law in economic
change, ﬁrst at the highest level, then at lower levels, by focusing on these
years.2
Forms of Law and Change from One Economy to Another
I hope that by now I have provided sufﬁcient evidence for my initial assertion
that the institution that is law (the many and variable actions undertaken
by lawyers and other governmental ofﬁcials, the formal and effective norms
originating from the practices of these individuals, and the systematic presuppositions shared among them) did very little to bring about change from
one economy to another. Though responding to distress when it wished,
law mostly stood by and watched. Many changes happened; few might be
traced from the actions, or back toward the reactions, of law. Capitalism as a
form of economic organization seemingly went its merry way, complaining
from time to time about law’s particular intrusions, but generally too busy
earning proﬁts while proﬁts could be earned, all the while coping with
changes in markets, to be much inﬂuenced by law.
My assertion, contrary to so much of the received wisdom of law professors
and legal historians alike, is not offered so much out of perversity, but in
an attempt to get us beyond the legalism, the focus on the three forms of
law enumerated above, that has infected the topic of law and economy for
at least a century. That law in all three forms is important in the daily lives
of humans is a proposition beyond question. That at times law attempts
to have such an impact on lives is also true beyond peradventure. That it
often fails of its intention is also reasonably clear. But great change, be it
social, political, or economic, is not a matter for calculus – sum the impact
of law on a large number of lives over the relevant range of years. Such
change is not even a more irregular sum, but a qualitative experience that
in retrospect is disjunctive, not additive, of this being a different time from
some other, remembered or imaginatively recreated, time.
2

Before doing so, it is important to note the futility of the task I undertake. Life is not
lived in conventional academic boxes, even less the complex of lives that is a society at
any time or times, place or places. Multivariate analysis makes sense only to the extent
that all other things can be held constant, but they never manage to stay that way.
More simplistic methods, such as mine, do not do the job of analysis any better, only
differently. And so, as I attempt to separate “law” and “economy” in order to assess their
respective roles in economic change, to separate the dancer from the music that together
are the dance, I ask the reader to be tolerant of the intrusion of metaphor. It is, after
all, a traditional way of capturing disparate elements into a readily, if only implicitly,
understood whole.
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To understand the way in which law mostly stands aside as economic
change occurs, not for lack of trying, but because it is the creation of humans,
cursed with memory and deﬁcient in foresight, let us look sequentially at
the role of the three forms of law as set forth in my story. Looking ﬁrst at
the systematic presuppositions of the law, it is clear that, as asserted many
pages ago, the law of property, contract, and theft, of mine and thine, so
structures capitalism that it is both impossible to notice and impossible to
miss. The precise effect of this distinctive underpinning to economic life
is, however, difﬁcult to gauge when examining economic change.
All change takes place within a systematic structure of law and is modestly pushed in particular directions by the alternatives that law, thus understood, makes possible. It is unquestionably true that, in the United States
in the short twentieth century, the systematic structure of law made it difﬁcult to conceive of a social democratic or communitarian alternative to
any one of a range of capitalisms, much less a state socialist alternative.
However, to identify this aspect of law as central to an understanding of
its role in economic change is to reduce the question of change to a tautological one that assumes that the change from, for instance, capitalism to
socialism is the only important economic change possible. For humans the
lived experience of less momentous changes may seem just as signiﬁcant;
in any case, it is a dubious practice to try to understand an institution by
looking at its participation in, or response to, the most extreme change
imaginable. Less extreme changes are difﬁcult enough to understand all by
themselves.
Although it is difﬁcult to know what an agnostic scholar might conclude
about the role of law in large-scale economic change under hypothetical
capitalist alternatives or alternatives to capitalism, I rather doubt that he
or she would conclude that law played a signiﬁcant role in such change.
The systematic structure of law is largely isomorphic with the particular
political economy – capitalism, socialism, or whatever – in this or any other
of the various countries of the North Atlantic world. To identify speciﬁc
instances of law’s action or reaction surely is to pull individual threads out of
a loosely woven fabric held together in so many other ways. For this reason
I believe it is best to treat the patient, silent work of law seen as systematic
structure as it appears to most economic actors, as invisible.
Looking next at the second form of law – formal and effective norms –
one can, of course, identify individual patches of law adopted for numerous
reasons that turn out, often surprisingly, to be crucial supports for economic
change, such as from an associationalist to an impatient economy. The
expansion of the middle class was founded on the New Deal institutions
that deﬁned labor, housing, and ﬁnance in these years. The GI Bill and Cold
War military expenditures did their part as well, as did the great growth of
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state university systems in the sixties. The shift in sectional economies was
similarly founded on New Deal labor, agricultural, and industrial policies
and on the concentration of new federal military and allied manufacturing
resources in the South and West during World War II. The rise of the
international economy of the last quarter of this century was founded on
the multilateral ﬁnancial and trade institutions established as part of the
American strategy for an integrated postwar world, as well as on Marshall
Plan aid.
However, no institution of law acted with even the vague intention
of expanding the middle class as part of the development of a consumer
society. Similarly, to the limited extent that wartime expenditures were
designed to counteract the colonial nature of the Southern or Western
economy, no one simultaneously wished to hasten the decline of heavy
manufacturing in the Northeast, much less to shift the country as a whole
toward a service economy. And, though the postwar ﬁnancial and trade
institutions and Marshall Plan aid were designed to foster international
trade, the major point of that effort was to limit the possibility of renewed
conﬂict in Europe, not to transform the international economy as a whole
and American participation in it in particular. Thus, it is not wholly clear
what to make of these more speciﬁc underpinnings for change beyond seeing
them as examples of the law of unintended consequences. Probably they were
reasonably essential to the particular large-scale changes identiﬁed and yet,
there will always remain the nagging doubt as to whether the absence of
one or more of these bits of law would have made much of a difference in
the shape of such changes, any more than would a change in one or more
threads alter a loosely woven fabric.
Looking ﬁnally at the third form of law – ofﬁcial action, the many and
variable actions undertaken by lawyers and governmental actors – at least
initially, this form seems more salient in the change from an associationalist
to an impatient economy. Much of governmental effort directed toward
managing economic life, both domestically and internationally, takes the
form of, in the traditional language of the law, discretionary action. Lawyers
worked endlessly to steer discretionary action and, when unable to do so,
to avoid its objectives. This is the world of ﬁscal and monetary policy and
international economic institutions, the world where economic historians
argue about whether the Smoot-Hawley tariff really caused the Depression
or whether Paul Volcker’s actions to break the Great Inﬂation were effective
in doing just that.
Clearly, Lord Keynes was right that such actions are of some causal signiﬁcance. The question is how much and in what direction. The Kennedy
tax cuts and Johnson’s guns and butter (and no new taxes) policy clearly
made a difference. But, it is not clear that they did more than provide very
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welcome life support for an economy built on an associationalism that was
already facing problems with which it would be unable to cope. Similarly,
twenty years of determined anti-inﬂationary policy, husbanded by both Paul
Volcker and Alan Greenspan, made it easy for the United States to build
its position as the broadest, deepest source of capital worldwide and, as
the possessor of a reasonably solid currency available in large amounts, the
effective central bank for the world. Still, it is not obvious that this tenacious policy preference did anything toward building a vital international
economy other than speed up that process a smidgen by modestly lowering
the cost of funds for the actors who were creating that economy, adding
an occasional thread to, or adjusting an existing one in, the loosely woven
fabric.
Gathered together, what all three forms of law – systemic presuppositions, formal and effective norms, and ofﬁcial action – seem to have done in
the change from an associationalist to an impatient economy is to augment
the prevailing winds, but modestly. Thus, the expansion of the middle
class was aided by expenditures for schools and colleges, the development
of urban road networks, permissive zoning for subdivisions and shopping
areas, and the indexation of Social Security beneﬁts. The shift in sectional
economies was aided by the development of the interstate highway system,
funding of the infrastructure necessary for expanded airline travel, toleration of sectional wage differentials, and the expansion of electrical capacity
to support air conditioning in Sunbelt climates. And the rise of the international economy was aided by export incentives, policies favoring limited
taxation of foreign income, support for the waterfront infrastructure necessary for containerized shipping, the relentless pursuit of tariff reduction,
and support for the push by domestic banking and securities industries into
foreign markets and for the creation of friendly domestic markets for foreign
borrowers and investors. The contribution of the International Monetary
Fund in attempting to stabilize currencies should not be underestimated
either.
Now, none of these were trivial actions, and logically all could be inverted
into a refusal to respond to claims for aid from those harmed by each of these
actions. But all were at the time seen as “no big deal.” Indeed, several of these
actions taken by law do not even rate mention in any brief history of the
American economy for these years. All might have been recognized as posing
difﬁcult problems at the time they were undertaken, but were not. Instead,
they were seen as presenting no signiﬁcant issues beyond the narrowly
partisan ones. Their taken-for-grantedness is the key to understanding law’s
actions in these cases. What is taken for granted, what is merely a matter
of course, is that which seems most natural, least controversial, in the eyes
of the recognized participants in the “pointless bickering” about law and
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economy that always swirls throughout any governmental apparatus. And
so, I believe it sensible to see such actions as no more than reinforcing
large-scale change.
Why then is it that the best that law in its three forms can do in the face
of the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” of capitalism is to augment
the prevailing winds? Let me recapitulate. First, it is reasonably apparent that both economic and legal actors, to the extent that they may be
more than formally distinguished, have at best a highly imperfect understanding of either economy or law at a given time and place. Second, this
highly imperfect understanding is not the singular result of ideological
blinkering, though, of course, all actors are both aided and limited in their
vision as a result of shared or separate ideologies. Rather, both systems –
economic and legal – are signiﬁcantly more complicated than most actors
are capable of understanding. At the same time, both systems are far more
subject to perturbations that these same actors believe are external to the
systems than most of them can conceive. Third, economy and law are also
signiﬁcantly more integrated than these actors realize, particularly with
respect to the legal infrastructure, both doctrinal and institutional, that
silently undergirds and channels economic activity and with respect to the
durable patterns of economic life that are instantiated by the humans who
are economic actors in all senses of that phrase – consumers, workers, manufacturers, retailers, ﬁnanciers, and the like. Thus, the failure of law to direct
or to respond to large-scale economic change is not a failure to act on the
dictates of intellect or even a failure of will, as Willard Hurst may seem to
argue, but a reﬂection of the limited ability of humans fully to understand
these two complex systems, a reﬂection not of policy failure, but of human
fallibility, as it were.
Three Attitudes Apparent in Law’s Response to Smaller Scale Economic Change
That law can do little but add to the steady winds of large-scale economic
change does not mean that it cannot and so does not act, occasionally significantly, at the level of smaller, more narrowly focused change. Here, where
actors can see more clearly, where the impact on the lives of Americans
is more obvious, law should be able to pay attention to the consequences
that economic change brings. And consequences there are. Any signiﬁcant
change in an economy – expansion or contraction, domestic or international, technological innovation or climatic alteration – will beneﬁt or
harm identiﬁable, limited segments of that economy – producers, ﬁnancial
or commercial intermediaries, transporters, sellers, workers, consumers – in
a systematic way. Those who are harmed by such change routinely respond
by seeking support to maintain their present, or regain their previous,
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economic position from whatever piece of the modern state that seems to
them likely to offer such assistance – administrative, executive, judicial, or
legislative. Sometimes the support sought will be forthcoming, though not
necessarily in the form requested, and at other times such support will not
be forthcoming. Oddly, even when such support is forthcoming, the support provided will only sometimes have the anticipated effects, and when
the support is denied, the absence of support will only sometimes bring
forth the anticipated consequences. Such is the recurrent, less than wholly
helpful, pattern experienced by those who would go to law.
Despite the essential indeterminacy of law’s reaction to smaller scale
economic change, a few underlying attitudes can be teased out. I can identify three of them – law’s general attitude toward change, its attitude
toward technological as opposed to cost-driven change, and its attitude toward system-wide change. First, with respect to law’s general attitude
toward smaller scale economic change, it is important to remember that
there are three possible answers that law might regularly give when economic actors seek its aid – stonewall change, support it indiscriminately,
or slow it down somewhat.
Consider stonewalling. Law might choose to stonewall change and so
give complete support to existing, and so entrenched, potentially politically
powerful, economic interests. It is actually hard to ﬁnd examples of such a
response of law in the short twentieth century. Most are reasonably obscure;
none merits mention in my story. Some instances can be supplied, however,
such as the refusal to eliminate the role of the liquor wholesaler after changes
in transportation made it plausible for many large producers to do so or the
surprisingly long refusal of law to respond to the demands of the railroads
to countenance elimination of a ﬁreman on a train after diesel engines had
replaced coal ﬁred engines, or of the brakeman after the airbrake replaced
the hand brake.
Next consider indiscriminate support. Law’s response to smaller scale
economic change might be to choose to favor change essentially indiscriminately and so ignore entrenched economic interests. This response of law
is less remarkably rather difﬁcult to ﬁnd. However, the continuing effort
of the Supreme Court to see that out-of-state mail order retailers do not
have to pay the same local corporate and sales taxes as in-state retailers is a
conspicuous exception. Oddly, the record on atomic power might be seen
to provide a double example of this response as law ﬁrst ignored the objections of the owners of existing coal-ﬁred plants and then, when the political
winds changed, ignored the interests of the owners of the new atomic power
plants.
Consider ﬁnally a modest slowing of smaller scale change. Law might
choose to work to retard change somewhat, but not to block it. Such a course
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of action would allow entrenched interests to work down their investments
over time – to avoid the economist’s seemingly heartless notion that sunk
costs are sunk and so everyone should move on. Instead, such interests might
recover at least a further part of their investments in monetary or personal
capital, though it should be remembered that the risks faced by monetary
capital can in theory, and at times in practice, be diversiﬁed much easier
than those faced by personal capital. Equally importantly, by allowing a
work down of sunk costs, law might buy off those political interests that
would most stridently oppose change and, in doing so, might indirectly
facilitate such change. This is actually the response most often evident in
my story.
The best examples are relatively recent. The entire panoply of trade
protection legislation has the structure of providing short-term respites for
industries suffering from the effects of foreign competition, which, though
always defended as providing the industry a chance to get its house in order,
are all but invariably followed by a decline in the size of the industry in
question. Here steel, textiles, and apparel are the classic cases. The same is
true of the negotiation of bi- or multilateral “voluntary export restraints,”
programs whereby foreign countries agree to hold their company’s exports
down to some level experienced at an earlier time for a certain period of
years. Here autos, steel, and again textiles (the multi-ﬁber agreements) are
equally classic cases, where on expiration of the agreement, again justiﬁed
as allowing the industry to get back on its feet, somehow the industry is
smaller.
A second attitude disclosed in law’s response to smaller scale economic
change, one that clearly overlaps with its more general response to such
change, can be seen by separately considering technological change, usually domestic in origin, and cost-driven change, usually foreign in origin.
Examples of the former within the short twentieth century would be the
extension of electric power to more and more homes; the development of
commercial radio, television, and the personal computer; and the building
of an effective airline passenger transportation network. This kind of change
alters the way that Americans as consumers can live their lives, spend their
time, envision their world; for them the change is visible but unproblematic. Examples of the latter would be the growth of textile manufacturing
in Asia and Central America, of export-oriented automobile manufacturing
in Europe and Asia, of similarly oriented electronics manufacturing in Asia,
of natural resources production in the South America and the Mideast, or
of computer programming skills in South Asia, instances where foreign
producers possess a comparative cost advantage. With this kind of change
lives remain much the same for most American consumers; the change is
almost invisible and almost equally unproblematic.
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For domestic producers – both capital and labor3 – of the same or of
alternative goods or services, the matter is entirely different. It makes no
difference to them whether change is technological or cost driven. These
are the people identiﬁably harmed by change whatever its source; these
are the people who will go to law for relief. The governmental response to
the economic dislocations felt from both types of change might therefore
be expected to be identical, given that the vast mass of consumers, the
ostensible public of the public interest, is not obviously harmed by either.
However, this turns out not to be so. Law will be more supportive of
those whose lives are threatened by cost-driven change than of those who
are threatened by technological change. Possibly, change in the way that
Americans as consumers can live their lives, spend their time, envision their
world makes it difﬁcult to harness empathetic concern for those whose
economic lives are harmed by this expansion in a consumer’s surround.
Deﬁnitely, the foreign invader is a more acceptable target than the domestic
insurgent.
Good examples can be found of law’s reaction to these two kinds of change.
Consider ﬁrst cost-driven change. In steel and autos, producers began by
ignoring, then disparaging, the foreign-made goods, and ﬁnally ceding the
lowest (and, on occasion, highest) margin products. When foreign producers
were recognized as a real competitive threat to the investments of both
capital and labor, a hue and cry went up to “save” the industry – in both
cases an industry with complacent management and poor labor relations.
Law repeatedly responded with temporary measures as the industry slowly
shrunk in size, though in autos, after foreign manufacturers established
domestic plants, claims for assistance went largely unanswered.
Textiles and apparel, including shoes, provide an interesting contrast, as
does consumer electronics. Here the initial pattern of management behavior was roughly the same as steel and autos; the response of law was not.
3

It is perhaps foolish for me to use the classic nineteenth-century language of capital and
labor when writing about owners and workers in the short twentieth century. Capital
comes in many varieties. Portfolio investment of varying kinds and sizes; productive
physical assets of bewildering types and ages, owned in diverse ways by people in
quite diverse circumstances; a similarly diverse range of real estate investments; owneroccupied homes and their contents; and of course the varying types of human capital –
might be considered a good start at a comprehensive listing, but nothing more. Similarly,
labor ranges from the chronically unemployed through day laborers, union and non-union
hourly workers in various settings, a similarly diverse group of salaried workers, to various
freelance artisans and professionals who might be either workers or worker/owners.
To attack this problem of understanding the contemporary structure of capital and
labor would require an entirely separate article. As I am comfortable with the classic
language because it ought to remind readers of signiﬁcant questions of dependence and
independence, I have chosen to maintain it.
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Textiles received the most continuous support – perhaps a function of the
concentration of the industry in the Southeast, where Congressmen tend
to serve long and reach high positions in party leadership and maybe also
a recognition of the continuous, signiﬁcant investments in manufacturing technology made by the industry. In consumer electronics, television
manufacturers received some support, but by the time the Walkman reinvented the radio, domestic manufacturers had moved their own production
offshore, law’s support ceased, and the market was quickly dominated by
foreign products. In apparel, domestic producers were largely at the mercy
of the branded apparel marketers, particularly in women’s wear. Here, little
effective opposition to foreign incursions was mounted and so law’s response
was weakest, for the marketers quickly outsourced manufacture to the very
areas where the threatening off-brand goods were originating.
The strength of these examples can be seen by comparing them to similar,
but domestic, changes in technology. As the computer replaced the business machine, the electric replaced the manual typewriter, and the Xerox
machine replaced various duplication processes from carbon paper through
stencils to thermofax, competitors either adapted or died. Mostly they died.
As television replaced radio, radio struggled, gave up live entertainment,
and ﬁnally reinvented itself as a purveyor of recorded music. Foreign, costbased insurgencies brought forth a response when domestic, technologically
driven ones did not. Capital is anything but xenophobic; this is not true of
humans more generally.
A third attitude disclosed in law’s response to smaller scale economic
change, a pattern that again overlaps with the two previously considered,
can be seen by examining a third type of economic change – system-wide
change, boom or bust. Examples of this kind of change would be the great
bust known as the Depression, the ﬁfties and nineties booms and the Great
Inﬂation. This kind of change tends to treat most, though never all, producers and consumers alike, as would the proverbial rising or falling tide. One
might expect that the kind of economic change that is broadly felt would
bring forth a similarly broad governmental response. However, system-wide
change tends to bring forth governmental responses that are less uniform
and broad based than narrow and targeted and are highly inﬂuenced by the
political exigencies of the time.
The response of law to the Depression provides a well-known example.
Although one can understand the New Deal’s focus on agriculture and
ﬁnancial institutions, given the collapse in farm and stock prices and the
raft of mortgage foreclosures and bank failures, other aspects of the Roosevelt
administration’s program are odd. Consider the relative exclusion of railroad
aid. The high point of railroad domination of transportation was 1916.
After that point the quantity of railroad trackage declined and competition
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from inter-city bus lines became serious. During the Depression a large
percentage of trackage was in receivership. Yet more of law’s attention was
paid to civil aviation, marginal for both passenger and cargo transportation,
and to trucking as well.
Natural resources industries were treated no more uniformly. Coal mining, incredibly depressed from the decline in industrial production and the
slow increase in residential and commercial oil heating; dependent on the
railroads, both as a customer and a transporter; and possessed of a strong, if
troubled, union tradition was lavished attention as a “sick” industry, even
receiving its own separate New Deal statute and so its own Supreme Court
declaration of unconstitutionality. Oil, where state-supported pro-rationing
of production still could not avert a price decline, was similarly supported
with federal legislation, though oil ﬁeld and reﬁnery workers were not
comparably powerful and the industry was substantially less essential to
the national economy, even given the growth of auto transportation, than
the railroads. Other mining industries, as well as timber, all a matter of
natural resources, were mostly ignored once the NRA fell apart, only to be
declared unconstitutional thereafter anyway.
Autos and steel were possibly not as depressed as coal, all things being
relative anyway, but were just as crucial to the economy and shared an equally
troubled history of labor relations. They received no special attention, nor
did any other manufacturing industry. And even agriculture was treated
spottily. Grains were lavished with law’s attention, but meat, poultry, and
ﬁsh production were largely ignored. Cotton got included in crop subsidies,
but not wool. Beans were ignored, and potatoes too, but rice, another starch,
though hardly a centerpiece of the northern European culture that shaped
this nation, received support as did sugar.
Now, all of these seeming anomalies can be explained by a combination of
political and economic analysis. But the need for such is precisely the point.
Despite broad-based economic distress, broad-based legislative support for
the economy was not forthcoming.
The Great Inﬂation of the sixties and seventies equally illustrates this
proposition. That law paid enormous attention to oil and natural gas production and pricing during these years is again easy to understand; the two
oil price shocks and one embargo gained the attention of an auto-dependent
nation in nothing ﬂat. Similarly, currency and balance of payments questions were of daily concern given the abandonment of the gold standard
and the much increased price of imported oil. But in a virtual repeat of the
Depression, banking, securities, and agriculture all received major attention
from law, as did commercial aviation and trucking. The big shift in law’s
attention was the railroads, a clear response to the Penn-Central bankruptcy
that led to the formation of Conrail and Amtrak. Yet, except for steel and
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autos, manufacturing was again largely ignored, as was most of agriculture,
except for the historically favored crops. Consumer prices received attention
with Nixon’s price control plan in the early seventies, but before and after
that event, ordinary Americans were basically left to lump it.
The similarity of the pattern of economic sectors attended to and ignored
forty years apart suggests certain durable features to law’s instantiation of
the politics of the economy. The continued political attention paid to the
economic interests dependent on law for the deﬁnition of their powers, such
as banking and securities, or dependent on law for their current economic
value, such as agriculture or natural resources, is not surprising. At the same
time such interest does not translate into narrow attainment of economic
desires, much less stability. The success of the savings and loan industry in
securing law’s ministrations led to the industry’s demise. And the banking
industry prospered, if not beyond, at least up to, its wildest dreams, through
a period in which its greatest legislative desire – the repeal of the GlassSteagall Act – was beyond its reach.
In some ways, more important than the durability of law’s response to
the politics of economy is the evidence that both the Depression and the
Great Inﬂation provide of law’s limited range of attention where matters
of system-wide economic change are concerned. The production, distribution, and consumption of manufactured goods, whether industrial or consumer, seemingly the engine of economic life, were (except for the National
Recovery Administration) largely ignored by law in cases of cyclical economic change. Perhaps these activities are too diffuse to bring politically
organized attention; perhaps they are too far removed from law’s regular
concerns, except as a purchaser of military supplies or construction services;
perhaps they are just too close to the heart of a capitalist economy.
Three Contexts for Law’s Response to Smaller Scale Economic Change
In addition to the three discernible attitudes disclosed in law’s response to
smaller scale economic change, I can proﬁtably examine three particular contexts for that response – infrastructural investment, regulatory investments,
and social circumstances. Consider ﬁrst infrastructural investments. One of
the great, unheralded, and almost invisible legal inventions prominent in
the short twentieth century is the public authority, an entity functionally
similar to the eighteenth-century corporation. Originally it was nothing
but a vehicle for evading state constitutional restrictions on state and local
debt and still, of course, functions as such. A legal entity is formally established as separate from its parent governmental unit, given building and/or
purchasing and, most importantly, bonding authority. It is then set on its
way to pursue the public good. Under the ﬁction that, as it is separate
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from its parental authority, it is not bound by constitutional restrictions
on the actions of the establishing entity, normally its objective is engaging
in building or buying something using borrowed funds, the repayment of
which is secured by some stream of revenue that the built or purchased asset
is supposed to throw off.
The best known of such entities established by a state or local government
is the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, the centerpiece of Robert
Moses’ New York empire. But such authorities also build and operate toll
roads, canals, harbors, airports, transit systems, hospitals, dams and their
power plants, convention centers, and sports arenas; they also build and then
lease public housing, state universities and their dormitories, and defense
plants. Creating such entities removes them somewhat from the rough and
tumble of legislative and executive politics and even where debt restrictions
are not constitutional, as is the case with the federal government, hides their
debt a bit from public scrutiny.
Public authorities are regularly established for the purpose of providing
infrastructure investment that it is hoped will bring positive economic
results for the relevant community. They are thus classic examples of law
working either to rehabilitate deteriorating facilities or to build new ones
and thus either to retard or to facilitate change. Three federally established
public authorities – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae – ﬁgure
reasonably large in my story; two others, the Tennessee Valley Authority
and the Bonneville Power Authority, are also well known. All ﬁve were
built to facilitate change; they and many others have served that objective
remarkably well, if not exactly in the way initially envisioned.
In contrast, most attempts to use public authorities to retard change,
for example by rehabilitating decayed canal or port structures with the
objective of bringing trafﬁc back to the area, have been notable failures.
Buffalo provides a good, if obscure, example. In the early ﬁfties Buffalo
ceased to be an important place for the trans-shipment of grain for ﬂour
milling and export as the mills were moved closer to Midwestern grain
markets and as barge transit down the Mississippi to the redeveloped port
at New Orleans became an increasingly feasible alternative to the older
route to East Coast ports via freighter through the Great Lakes and rail
thereafter. An increasingly decrepit and inactive waterfront mirrored the
decline of Buffalo’s milling and trans-shipment activities, and so, a port
authority was created to make the port more attractive. Soon thereafter the
failure of the local surface transportation company brought the change of
the port authority into a more general transportation authority that took
over airport operations as well. Forty years later the result of these actions by
law is instructive: a modest, but cheerful airport survives on landing fees;
a surprisingly pleasant local transportation system limps along, despite
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signiﬁcant grant-based investment, as ridership decline follows population
decline; and the port is still sad to see. It can’t possibly be rehabilitated
because there is little reason for anyone to use it as lake freighter-dependent
industry slowly disappears. So, almost no fee income is generated that might
fund rehabilitation.
A second context for examining law’s response to smaller scale economic
change is in threats to regulatory investments, characteristically made as
part of the legacy of various New Deal economic recovery programs. Tied
to associationalism as they were, the New Deal economic programs tended
to think of business relationships as static and so favored dividing markets
in ways that, although they did not guarantee that proﬁts would be made,
did allow all existing participants to compete in gentlemanly ways within
industry segments while keeping potential competitors happy with similarly protected hunks of the overall economic “turf.” This policy is most
obviously evident in the banking, insurance, and securities industries. It is
also prominent in communications and transportation and can be seen in
agricultural programs as well.
The associationalist assumptions underlying economic policies in areas
such as these create particular problems when the affected industries ﬁnd
that economic change, sometimes technological, at other times cost driven,
undermines the assumed static structure of competition. This is because over
time this structure becomes built into the valuation of existing investments
and leads to making further investments whose value is similarly dependent on the existing industry structure. How to unravel these investments
fairly has bedeviled law for the past half-century. Two examples should
sufﬁce.
American agricultural policy, like the postwar agricultural policy of other
major European and Asian industrial states, is an incredible mess. Here, the
New Deal agricultural policy trio of ascertainably rational but practically
ineffective production controls – predicated on acreage under cultivation
rather than total yield, crop subsidies that sustained the most depressed
segments of the increasingly irrelevant agricultural past, and modest soil
conservation programs – has persisted despite generations of otherwise withering critique and through a period of extraordinary declines in the farm
population and a technologically driven explosion in per acre productivity derived from increased use of expensive fertilizers, farm machinery, and
hybrid crops. Although it is surely plausible that were the Senate elected
in proportion to population, agricultural subsidies would be withdrawn,
it seems to me that the continuing program less reﬂects the constitutional
rule giving each state, regardless of population, two senators than it does
the difﬁculty of withdrawing subsidies once they have been built into the
fabric of economic assumptions that are farm valuation.
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To withdraw subsidies imperils farm income, which imperils farm mortgages (and so ownership), which imperils farm mortgage lenders, a narrow,
local branch of lending. Thus, what may be a rational economic plan for
ending subsidies that in the long run may beneﬁt agriculture and the entire
national economy creates short-run problems that are extremely painful
and threaten the owners of the existing farms, agricultural cooperatives,
and ﬁnancial institutions as well as farm communities, including not just
farm implement dealers and feed, seed, and chemical sellers, but also auto
dealers, grocers, schools, churches, and restaurants. Lacking the political
will to buy existing beneﬁciaries out of their subsidies through a program
of capital grants, and already having extended governmental guarantees
under the program of mortgage insurance offered by Farmer Mac, the only
politically palatable solution is hobbling along under an endlessly adjusted,
obviously defective program.4
The tangled story of the transformation of the segmented worlds of banking, insurance, and securities provides a modest counterpoint to the difﬁculties with agricultural policy. The continuing breakdown of the segmented
structure of these industries can be told either as a case of domestic insurgency, as each of these industries tried to escape from the straitjacket that
was established during the Depression in the name of restoring conﬁdence
in the ﬁnancial system, or as a case of a foreign insurgency, as the availability
of more attractive foreign investments over times led to the unraveling of
the New Deal ﬁnancial order. And yet, rather than do nothing, as if the
insurgent were domestic, or provide transitional support, as if the insurgent
were foreign, law’s response in almost all cases was to expand the powers of
the institution whose separate protected sphere was threatened by ﬁnancial
innovation.5
Here again the long-standing set of economic controls created a set of
investments whose value was signiﬁcantly determined by the structure of
regulation. Trying, though not necessarily succeeding, to maintain relative
parity between industry segments was a response that served to protect
the relative, though hardly the absolute, value of these regulatorily based
investments. Thus, attempts to alter the income tax treatment of mutual as
against stock insurance companies, where mutuals possessed a signiﬁcant
advantage, were never successful, but a change in the investment powers
of one regularly led to a change in the investment powers of the other.
Similarly, in the segmented world of banking, branching by commercial
4

The recent case of tobacco acreage allotments is hardly an example to the contrary, for
it took years of health concerns, unlikely to be reproduced elsewhere in agriculture, to
overcome political opposition to such a “bailout.”
5
The case of the deregulation of interstate trucking under the Motor Carriers Act is to
the contrary. I cannot explain why.
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and by mutual savings banks grew approximately apace, though in the
former case most often by merger and in the latter case because of the legal
form, most often by building new ofﬁces. The same is true of change across
industry segments. Banks became able to sell securities only when securities
ﬁrms were able to offer bank-like services through money market “wrap”
accounts that allowed check-writing privileges.
Of course, the most notorious examples of such attempts to maintain
the relative value of regulatorily founded investments is the interaction
between commercial banks and savings and loan associations – the savings
and loan crisis, discussed previously. It began with the development of
money market funds in the securities industry that drew deposits from a
banking industry that was limited by law as to the interest it could pay on
deposits. Eliminating these limits, the initial response, exposed the fact that
the greater range of loans that commercial banks could enter into meant that
they could earn more interest than could savings and loans that were limited
to making residential mortgage loans. And so, these restrictions were lifted.
An unpleasant cascade of events followed such well-intentioned actions.
A third context for examining law’s response to smaller scale change
can be identiﬁed by emphasizing certain social regularities in law’s actions.
Indeed, some would say that law nearly always allows the capitalists to
win. This notion, coming largely out of labor relations where it has some
real bite, is more difﬁcult to support in circumstances where law confronts
economic change more generally. In such circumstances capital and labor,
employers and employees, stand on both sides of the issue that law faces –
favor old capital and labor or new. Each has a claim to law’s attention –
the old, because of ties to the existing community; the new, because of its
asserted but unprovable place in the economic future.
As is evident from my story of economic change and from the preceding
analysis, at least in the short twentieth century, law has tended to favor
new capital, and derivatively new labor, because dreams are easier to spin
than realities are to dress up. At times law does this by providing some
transitional support for the past while facilitating a seemingly brighter
future. At other times, not even transitional support is provided. However,
there is a regularity, an identiﬁable pattern of winners and losers among
those whose lives and fortunes are altered by smaller scale economic change.
Not surprisingly, most often law is more effective when offering transitional
support to capital than to labor.
Examples are reasonably easy to identify. Consider, again, autos and steel.
In both of these industries capital and labor received approximately the same
protection from foreign competition. Indeed, labor arguably received more
favorable treatment in that pension guarantee legislation extends protection
to human capital that is unavailable to investment capital. Yet, there is no
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great record of poor, demoralized stockholders in either the auto or steel
industries as there is of poor, demoralized employees in those industries
who never made it to retirement before their jobs disappeared. The reason
is simple. The time horizon of capital, especially ﬁnancial capital, but also
bricks and mortar capital, is shorter that that of labor. Moreover, capital can
diversify more readily to reduce risk. A working life is forty to ﬁfty years and
retraining to build new human capital investments becomes increasingly
difﬁcult after ﬁfteen to twenty of those years. In contrast, a long horizon for
the recovery of a capital investment is surely those same ﬁfteen and twenty
years, at which point dis- and re-investment are substantially easier. And
over the last twenty years of the short twentieth century, the mean time
horizon for capital recovery has surely shortened. Of course, capital losses
in the early years before recovery is had are common, indeed more common
than long-term recovery. And everyone who studies industry carefully has
discovered stories of capital loss after long- term recovery that are every
bit as devastating to the individual entrepreneur as are similar job losses
to individual laborers. But in many, perhaps, most cases, capital has more
accumulated assets to fall back on, and so equal treatment of human capital
is anything but.
VI. A MODEST CONCLUSION

How then might the complex relationship between law and economic
change, the change from an associationalist to an impatient economy, in
the short twentieth century be summarized? Although law contributes little to such large-scale change, again the great silent background of law that
structures economic relations needs to be emphasized. Common assumptions about economic life under capitalism that are formalized as the rules
of contract, tort, and property do their silent work. And as the winds of
change blow and calm, so too do the institutions of law, including those
that are commonly described as political, working as they do modestly to
speed up change, to augment the prevailing winds.
What then of the more active work of law, work carried on with respect to
smaller scale change? Description of law’s response to the winds of change
in terms of the great battle between laissez-faire and regulation that ﬁgures
so prominently in the political rhetoric of both the left and the right in
America is clearly inappropriate. In general, law favors neither position, but
most commonly, but rather unsystematically, attempts to facilitate change
by modestly retarding it. As it does so, it tends to be willing to respond
more readily to economic harm suffered at the hands of foreign “invaders”
of the allegedly national economic “turf” than of the domestic invaders of
an individual industry’s “turf.” It pays more attention to segments of the
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economy whose powers, or the value of whose investments, are dependent
on law. Overall, it is more solicitous of new capital and labor than old,
but even here, more to the harms suffered by capital than by labor. None
of this ought to be surprising. Law, like other human institutions, works
most often by half-steps that afﬁrm the past while moving cautiously into
the present and hiding from the future. Americans, like most humans,
are notoriously xenophobic, however much they love their imported DVD
players. And the United States is a capitalist, though hardly a free market
capitalist, and deﬁnitely not a social democratic, economy.
VII. CODA

Readers have asked that I explain more precisely what I mean by “law” and
so its relationship to “society” and “the/an economy,” as well as to ﬂesh out
the metaphor of the “loosely woven fabric.” I can do none of these things,
but my readers deserve an explanation for that fact.
Karl Llewellyn was fond of speaking of “law/government” as a way of eliding the separation of “law” from “politics,” a separation that he believed to
be unhelpful for analysis. I would be comfortable following his lead by eliding my deﬁnitional problems through the use of the cognates “law/society”
and “law/economy,” as I ﬁrmly believe that neither dichotomy is useful for
understanding the subject I am trying to explicate (or any other subject
either.) Unfortunately, I have learned that readers do not always accept such
neologisms, as the soundless sinking of Llewellyn’s makes clear. I am fully
aware that his academic proﬁle was far higher than mine. So, I have largely
resisted doing what would be comfortable for me and have decided to work
within the only language that I have, a language in which “law” by deﬁnition is neither “the/an economy” or “society,” no matter how much I may
wish them to be seen as deeply, inextricably intertwined.
In the vain attempt to avoid this aspect of “the prison-house of language,”
I have chosen to leave “law” and “an economy” but weakly demarcated (see
italicized explanations offered at the outset of this chapter). I do not use
“society” at all and leave “the economy” to a usage close to the rise and fall of
the level of economic activity as well as the order and chaos experienced by
participants in economic activity. In doing so, I have been able to focus on
change in the form of, which is to say our understanding of, capitalism over
time. By thus cabining usage I can present “law” and “an economy” as inseparable, except when analysis in the English language makes it impossible
to avoid a usage that might imply to the contrary.
I have tried to bridge the gap between my understanding of the relationship between law and the/an economy and the usage available to me with
a metaphor of the “loosely woven fabric.” I like this metaphor because, if
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one pulls at too many threads in a loosely woven fabric, it rather quickly
becomes a pile of thread and not a fabric at all. It is for this reason that I have
not developed this metaphor extensively. Doing so would turn it into a pile
of separate but entangled observations about “law” and “the/an economy”
and it is just such a jumble that the metaphor is designed to avoid.
I hope that readers have been able to be patient with the locutions I
have adopted. Until we have a language that allows for the suppression of
dichotomies such as law and politics, law and society, law and economy,
such is the best that this writer can do.

